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Prefr,torv note .'oy the UHCTAD secretariat 
J.. . r.rhe importance of formulating· policies for dealing with the adverse 
consequences 2.ssocia-i;ed with the reverse transfer of technology (brain drain) 
has been stressed in several resolutions and proposals adopted recently by the 
international cormnunity. The General Assembly~ in its resolution _3362 (S-VII) 
of 19 September 1975, Section III, :paragraph 10, pointed to the "urgent need 
to formulate national ~nd international policies to avoid the 'brain drain' 
and to obvinte its adverse effects". In its resolution 2 (I) of 5 December 1975, 
the Committee on Tran3fer of 1l'echnolog;y of illTCTAD requested the Secretary-General 
of UNCTAD to "carry out studies assessing the magnitude, composition, c.:,,uses 
2.nd effects of ·the outflovr of trained personnel from the developing countries 11 
and to "convene a g-roup of gover:;1D1ental experts to examine the studies and to 
submit, if :possible, recomi:nendations to the Cornmi ttee on Transfer of Technology 
2,t its second session" (paragraph 9 of the resolutior1) ~ In its resolution 
87 (IV), adopted in Nnirobi en 30 Y.uiy 1976, the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development recommended (in paragraph 18) that all countries, 
p&.rticularly those benefiting- from the brain drain, should, in the light of' 
UHCTAD's work on reverse transfer of technology "consider what measures may be 
necessary to deal with the problems posed by such outflow ••.•• ". Similar 
resolutions and recommendations hP.ve also been adopted in other United Nations 
forums, particularly, ILO, WHO ancl IDIBSCO. 
2. The present study, prepared by Professors Pomp and Oldman, examines some 
of the legal and aculiinistrnti ve implications of policy proposals designed to 
transfer gains from brain drain to the developing countries. At this. stage, the 
dbcusnion is· of a very pr91imin2.ry naturci and merely attempts to outline the 
1,ain problem areas rather than to suggest solutions. 
3. The study is one of several.being presented to the Group and f'orms part of 
UUCTAD' s continuing effort to improve understanding of the brain drain problem, 
its economic and soc .. J.l. iuplications and the policy options facing the 
international conununity. In ·i;he _p.Lanfling 01.· this study, the UNCTAD secretariat has 
benefited considerably froin the co-operation of the Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs of the United tfations Secretariat. 
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Sunm12,ry 2-nd. conclusions 
4.' This study discusses the J.og2,l and a<1'11inistrati ve implications of transferring 
to the developing countries part of the benefits accruing both to the migrants and 
to the developed countries from the reverse tranofer of tecl1nology (orain 
drain). The term "brain drain" is usod as a portmanteau expression to indicate 
the migration of professional, technical, and kindred persons (PTKs) from the 
developinrr to the. developed countries. Though this definition accurately 
describes a large element of the brain drG.in, it is restricted in a number of 
respects. 1'7irst, countries 2.re not neatly divided into developing and 
developed. A colmtry th2.t is classified 2.s a developing country for son::.e 
purposes may be considered as 2, developed country for other purposes. Second, 
not all PTK mirration occurs lJetvreen tho developing and developed countries. 
Migration occurs amont5 the developing countries themselves and amonc the 
developed count1~ies themselves. 'I'hiTd, ths term PTK is too restrictive; for 
some develo:9ing countries, ·the brain drain n.::cy consist in part of businessmen, 
and international civil servants, persons not usuc:,lly classified o,s PTKs. For 
some countries, the loss of mc:npow~r may co,.1sist more of unskilled labour than 
of brain drain. 
5. The terms developed 'country, developing country and PTK, despite their 
over-simplification, are nonetheless usefu.l in f::·aminc the debate, since they 
serve to indicate the basic nature of the underlying problems without detracting 
from the general applicability of the discussion. 
6. Vvhile a rn.:unber of f2.ctors can be identified that contribute to the 
mig-ration of PTKs, there seems little doubt that since the mid-1960s, the aim 
of the major developGd countries of innnigTation ho,s been to discriminate, whether 
or not within the context of overall quot2. limits, in favour of PTICs to the 
detriment of the unskilled. The attitude of the United States, shared by 
other developed countries, has been express0d succinctly by a former Secretary 
of State: 11We are in the international market for brair~s." 1/ Hot surprisingly, 
during recent years PTKs from thG developing countries havo cone to represent 
an increasing perccmt2.ge of inm1igration into the developed countries, thus 
causing- concern over the effect this loss of manpower is having on the economies 
of the developing countries. 
7. The causes of the brain drain are complex, and a munber of remedies have 
been suggested at various times for dealing rri th the pro1)lem. Some suggestions 
involve direct or indirect restrictions on the flow of migration from developing 
to the developed countries. Those restrictions, however, raise serious conflicts 
vri th basic rights und.er 2. humanitarian international order and for that reason 
are precluded from consideration. Hore recently, it has been suggestGd that a 
part of the benefits arising from thG brain drain ought leg-itimately to be 
transferred to the develo11ing' countries. In brief, the proponents of this argument 
rely on the basic pJ::-inciple that in a vrorld of imperfect mobility, individuals 
rrho are able to migrate ought to share some part of their increase ct benefits in 
order to improve the welfare of those left behind. The ar::;wnent io strengthened 
1/ Quoted in United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Brain Drain: 
A Study of the Persistent Issue of International Scientific Ilobili ty, Washington, 
United States Government Printing Office, 1974, :p.36. 
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to the ext'.:mt that hie-her or· specialized edu.c2,tion, an essential requirement 
fo;r mi{rra,tiort -into · ,Jst developed cou:c1tries, is accessible. on:.;:- to the children 
o{ the politic2,l anc1 econ01:1ic •.Hi.ts, or tl1020 livi:r..g in tb::· ur1)an areas. If a. 
lack of equal educational opportunit;i,r exists, thoce able to migrate exercise a 
:privilege or an exclusi vely--held 2,dvantage and should share their incree.sed 
benefits with tho3e l2;cking the some o~Ypurtuni ti0s for ed:.1c0,tional and economic 
advancement. J\Ioreover, i:i: the dovelopinc couniir? incurs losses due to the 
migration, as seems likely, th8 ,;killed m:igrr:,nt o:;_• the hoot clGveloped country 
ho,s an additional oblil5'ation to share t:iwir b-e:1efi ts in ordei~ to compens2.te 
:for th0 welfare losoec cxpor5-enced b;y the dcvelopine country. Recent 
contributions to the Ii to:rature on th2 bi~ain d.ro,in consist of efforts by 
economists to identify the: n::-,tm~e and co:mposi tion of the various types of 
losses associated with sl:illocl 1dgration. Though difficult to q_u2,ntify, 
these losses provide 1-1n indeponclcnt basis on Yrhich to justify thG proposals 
discussed in this study. Y . 
8. The proposals discussed in detail in the body of the stud3r fall into three 
major categ-ories; (1) Tax incentives to encourage migr2.nts (as well as 
non-migr2,nts) to m2lrn volunta:1:y contributions to special internationo.l human 
resource funds (IHii.F) i'or use in the devclopins countries; (2) A supplementary 
tax: on PTK income in the developed country of ir.illligTation, the revenue from 
which vrould be used to augmEmt the net transfer of resom·ces to the 
developing countries; and ( 3) An assessment on host develo_Rcd countries in 
recognition of the b::mefi to accruing to them from migrc:c.foii.. The resources 
raised thereby boi.nfr simila:.~ly tTansferred to the developing countries. As 
will be seen, the proposals are, to some extent, interdependent and are 
presented as a package. However, each proposal examined is on its own merits 
and can be adopted separately or in combination with the other proposals. 
y Despite the short period it has been under considera ti,,n, the argument . 
that a part of the benefits of the brain dr2in should be transferred to the 
developing countries has received comprehensi 'Te analytical treatment. The 
Reverse Transfer of Technology, Economic Effects of the Outflow of Trained 
Personnel from Developing Countries~ Stud,r by the UNCTAD secretariat 
('m/B/Ac.u/25/Rev,l) United Nations Publication, Sales No. E,75II. D.l, and 
"The Reverse Transfer of Technology. 1ts Dimensions, Economic Effects and 
Policy Implications: A study by' tho UNCTAD secretariat" (TD/B/C.6/7), 
Geneva, October 1975. See the accompanying paper prepared for UNCTAD by 
J.N. Bhagwati entitled "The Reverse Transfer of Technology (Brain Drain): 
International Resource Flow Accounting-, Compensation Taxation and Related 
Policy Proposals" (TD/B/c.6/Ac.4/2), in which the economic implications 
of the brain drain for the developing countries are analysed. other 
comprehensive references include: J.N. Bhagwati and M. Partington (eds.), 
Taxi Brain Drain: A Pro osal, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing 
Co., 1976; J.N. ed. The Brain Drain and Taxation: Theory and 
Empirical Analysis, Amsterdam, North-Holland Publishing Co., 1976. 
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9. Subsequent sections of this study set forth the legal and administrative 
difficulties surrounding the implementation of these proposals and discuss their 
optimal formulation. The remainder of this section briefly summarizes the 
proposals and provides backgTound information that may help tq ~lace the 
discussion in its proper perspective. 
A. Voluntary contributions to international human resource funds (IHFRs) 
10. This proposal (discussed in chapter I) can be dealt with briefly here. 
The suggestion is that tax incentives ought to be provided by the developed 
countries to enable migrants, their employers, and all other tax payers to 
ma.~e voluntary contributions to recognized organizations or to especially 
created international hwnan resource funds (IHFRs). j/ If, as is believed, 
migrants and the firms that employ them are generally willing to make some 
contribution to the developing countries in recognition of their moral 
obligations, the level of contribution may be significantly enhanced by such 
incentives. The assumption is that the tax incentives wili induce a response 
by taxpayers,' including non-I'ligrants nho have an interest in the developing 
countries, that exceeds the sacrifice in revenue attributable to the tax 
incentive. The sacrifice in tax revenue arising from the grant of tax 
incentives can properly be regarded as a contribution by the developed country. 
The proposal is particularly attractive since it entails no restriction on 
migration and is completely voluntary on the part of the donors. In developed 
countries that already provide tax incentives for charitable contributions 
within their existing framework, incentives for IHRFs would be a reasonable 
means of taking into account the special preferences of the immigrant 
population. 
E. A supplementary tax on PTK earnings in host developed countries 
11. The second proposal, a supplementary tax on the income of PTKs, was 
first suggested by Professor Bhagwati in a pioneering article published in 
1972. !J Proceeds from this special tax would be used to augment the net transfer 
of resources to the developing countries. Le~al, constitutional· and 
administrative issues are comprehensively treated in chapters II, III and the 
appendix of this study. However, certain aspe.cts of the proposal are dealt 
with below to clarify any possible misconceptions. 
1. Restricted international mobility and its implications for the 
brain drain 
12. Developed countries commonly restrict immigration both quantitatively, 
through ·annual quotas, and -qualitatively, through various criteria that 
tY})ically favour skilled over unskilled migrants. Because of these restrictions, 
the opportunity to migrate is a privilege extended to a favoured minority 
in the developing country. It seems proper that those who benefit from the 
2/ This idea was first proposed by the authors in 0, Oldman and 
R. Pomp, "The Brain Drain: A Tax Analysis of the Bhagwati Proposal", 
World Development, Oxford, vol,3. No, 10, October 1975, pp.751-63. 
M J. Bhagwati, "The United States in the Nixon Era; The End of 
Innocence", Daedalus, Autumn 1972. 
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exercise of this privilege should shars part of their gd.n in order to increase 
the welfare of tho,,9 who remain behind in the develc,ping couE-tries. Taxing 
part of the increased benefits can, in one sense, be vievied 2,s an extension 
across national frontiers of the principle of progressive taxation. Nor is this 
a radical innovation in taxation 9 since it is acceptable under international 
custom for countries to assert tax jurisdiction over nationals abroad, 
13, The restrictions that·each developed country imposes on entry may 
reduce immigration to 2, level below that which would exist in the absence of 
all controls, producing an element of "rent" or "surplus 11 in the income of 
each skilled migrant, This rent or surplus could be taxed without affecting 
overall levels of migration. If the rates were chosen carefully, the tax 
would 2,ccordingly have no effect 0~1 migration, and this should increase the 
attractiveness of the. proposal. 
14, Al though overall migr2,tion might not be affected, the tax might however 
reduce the size of the waiting list (i.e., the excess demand) for entry 
into the developed country. A significant reduction in the size of the 
waiting list might, inter alia, have the desirable effect of reducing the 
domestic supply of PTKs vri th a concomitant savinfrs in education costs and 
a reduction in salaries. 
2. Comparisons with an exit tax 
15, It is im}Jortant to stress thd the proposed special tax on skilled 
migrants is intended as an assessment on their developed country incomes 
only after migration has taken plE,ce. It differs radically from an exit t~, 
which requires pa;yment of the te,x prior to emigration. In a country where 
the rate of private savings is insignificant, any non-neslig·ible exit tax would 
be prohibitive, except for individuals having access to foreie:n capital 
through person2,l coY'.tacts. Moroover, since g_n 0xi t tax is a c:1ce-for-all 
levy only, it would involve a lump sum payment of some ma137-1i tude which could 
be discriminatory in its effect. By contrast, the proposed supplementary 
taJ, is clearly superior. It would not be a prerequisite of emigration but 
would be levied annually for a limited duration on the PTKs income in the 
developed country which could be used to pay the to.x. Most important, the 
proposed tax conforms closely with existing patterns of international 
tax3,tion. 
c. An assessment on developed countries 
16. The third J:)roposal, discussed in ch2,pte1° IV, relates to 2,11 assossment 
on the developed countries of irn.1uigration, as opposed to the migrants, in 
recognition of the benefits 2,ccruins to host populations from irnn1igro,tion. 
The 2,ssessment would be based on 2, formula. In cases where the assessment 
did not reflect adequately the flow of PTKs between specific pairs of 
countries, supplementary bilateral agreements could be 1,rovided. 
D. A sarrrple packa_g£ 
17, The three sepa,r2,te proposals d.iscussed briefly in paragraphs 10 - 16 
could ideally be considered as part of a total package combining elements of 
the three in different proportions reflecting the preferences of the parties 
conc9rned. Vfuile one pa,rty might emphasize chaneres in developed co1.L.1try tax 
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11:nw to encourage volunt;_ny contributions, anotlle:c might its 
support for t,:>oxing I)TK3 directly, and still 2.nother might ci ve top priority 
to government payments to intE:rnational hULE1l1. resource funds ( IHRFs) in 
recoenition of the benofi ts fortuitously recei vod by the developed countr;y 
.:10 a resnl t of the b:r2,i11 drain. A sample pad::2,gc me,;y thus consist of; 
) A modest intern2.tiom'.lly levied br2.in d.r2,in t2.x, say c,t a rcte between 
5 and 10 per cent~ levied 2.0 a surtax o~ the t2-:x paid to the developed countries 
by a defined class of :t'J:Ks foi· a period of not more than 10 years after they 
first reach leveltJ of income sul,ject to the tax. The period oi' 10 years is 
suggested in order, on the one to o.llovr cient time for PTKs to 
reach significant levels of inc0i11c 2nd, on the other h2,nd, to cut off a 
PTICo tax li2;bili ty once a c11'ust1:cnti2.l number of ;:/et.rs has cone oy. 
(b) A modest interm,tion;.l :J.ssessment on eo.ch develo1Jed country receiving 
a brain drain flovr from the developin.s- countries estim2.tcd to exceed a 
defined and trien_Ylially revised £loor firure. 
(c) The crcntion of specii:,lly chartered organiz?.tions - designated 
as Internationo.l Human Ile::;ource Funds (II-L.lF) - under developed country 2.nd 
developing count:c;i,r au:::;pices in conformity with a model IIillF to ba prepo,Tcd 
and continually revised in accord vri th internationally procedures. 
18. The or13T111izatiorn:1,l st:ructu..re of tl10 proposed funds coLlld be designed 
fairly easily. However, tho technical design of "both the brain dTain tax and 
the intern2.tionecl assessment schmno rrould re aclC:Li tiona,l legal ano,lysis, 
further qualitative ar12,lysis in me2,suring o..nd ectimating o,ppropri2-te levels 
of tax and 2-ssessnent to achieve dosircc:. levels of :cevenue, o,nd the 
out of a host of administ:r2:-ti ve pTobleDs before o..ction could be taken b;y 
nation&l and international bodies. The appendix to the present study 




19. The study is' di vided into four m2-in chapters. Chapter I examines the 
main is st.ms involved in insti tilting- 0:.1. scheme· for voluntary contributions 
to specially created Internt.tional Human Resource Funds (IHR.Fs) i the 
proccedo of such funds co~1ld be used for financing specified projects in 
cfoveloJiing countries e::cperiencing the brain drain. The first part of 
chu:pter I outlines ways of organizing such a scheme and the possible uses to 
which the fund's resources may be pt,t. 'i'he second part examines the kinds of 
tax incentives or ben2fits that nay be offered to potential contributors in 
order to ensure their maximum participetion in the proposed scheme. Criteria 
for .elicibili ty for tax incentives arc also c1iscussed. 
20. Chapte1· II analyses various al terns ti ve approaches to lE:vying a 
supplement2-ry tax on the income earned in the developed countrie·s by sldlled 
migrants f:com the developing countries. Section A provides a brief introduction 
to international income tax rule3, and serves as u background for the subsequent 
discussion. Sections Band C discuss two poosible approaches to applying .a 
supplementary tax on the br2.in drains (a) a tax levied by the developing 
countries and collected by the host developed countries, and (b) a tax 
levied and collected oy the developed countries n.nd channelled to the 
developins· countries . The discussion highliehts the legal o.nd ad.mini strati ve 
problems of imi)lcmentation •. 
21. Chapter III e.xrunines the possibility and fcc::..sibili ty of introducing 2.n 
international brain drain tax (IllDT), .::1s v .. way of avoiding- come of the lesal and 
admi1:.istrative problems discussed in chapter IL In particular, this chapter 
identifies the i~ole international org2.niz2.tions, such a.s the United Nations, 
can play in overcoming these problems and in effectively implementing an IBIYr. 
22. Chapter IV exarn.ines briefly the modalities for levying a speciD ..l 
international G..ssessment on host a.evclopec1 countries in reco;311i tion of the 
lJenefits that these oountrio:3 derivG from the immigration of ·skilled manpower 
from the developing countries. Thie proposo.l vroulcl be the easies t to 
implement as it ymuld not involve any of the juridical and administrative 
intricacies that charo..cterize other proposals discus::,ed in the study. 
23. Finally, the appendix conk.ins an in-depth analysis of the main structural 
issues in the dcsirn of an international lJrain d.J.~ain tax (TBDT). 
24 • . A summary and the main conclusions which emerge from the analysis are 
presented in parag--raphs 4 - 10. 






25. The proposals discussed in this study would be expected to lead to an · .,. 
increase in the resources available for transfer to the developing countries. 
These resources could be transferred either to the developing country 
governments directly or to developing country projects through the disburse-
ments of intermediate organiza.tions, here called International Human Resource 
Funds. Such Funds may be recipients of voluntary contributions from private 
individuals or of proceeds raised through taxes or through assessments on the 
governments of developed countries as later noted in chapters II 1 III and IV. 
A. Organizing and using IBRF s 
1. Hou organized 
26. One or more of such Funds might be created in accordance uith international 
practice as organizations \Ji th defined powers to receive and spend funds. 
UNICEF is a prime example of this today. IHRFs might also be created under 
the laws of any particular regional organizations. The developed countries 
might create or charter IHRFs. Current examples are the United States and 
United Kingdom Commi ttecs for UNICEF, through ,,,hich voluntary contributions in 
those countries are funne:lled to UIHCEF. Finally, some developing countries 
might decide to charter IHRFs to attract funds for special projects. 
27, The legal characteristics of these organizations constituting IHRFs 
would vary some\·rhat depending upon their source of authority, but 2-ll of 
them would have certain basic features in,cornmon. They uould be exempt 
from truces on their receipts, and in many, if not all~ A.8ses voluntary 
contributions made J_') e.pproved IHRFs vould 1'1enefit from tax cc lcessions of 
the sort described in section :B of this ch;:i,:pter. An IHRF uould have to be 
non-profit in the sense that its resources could be used only for stated purposes 
and not. for commercial investments. 1i111c governing structure of IHRFs would need 
to be specified in the charters and 11ould be tailored to facilitate decisions in 
allocating IHRF :resources in accord with stated charter · purposes. 
2. Stated purposes 8nd uses of resources of IlIRFs 
28, While International Human Resource Fur1.ds should be able to allocate their 
resources to general development purposes or generc1,l education purposes, many 
might prefer specially designed programmes prepared for such Funds. A 
particular programme might conGist of research designed to counter the brain 
drain itself. Another might focus on training people to develop the capacity 
to carry out that special research. nesources could also be channelled into 
programmes aimed at strengthening the domestic technological capability of 
developing countries or into socially-oriented projects. In any event~ it 
might be desirable to have a multiplicity of Funds and decision-making groups 
for the formulation of spending programmes. 
29. While the present study does not focus attention on the uees of IBRFs, 
it shou~d be obvious that the success of 2ny means of raising Tevenues for the 
Funds will be largely dependent on the articulation of Fund objectives and 
the manner and degree of their implementation. For exainple, 8ny one or more 
of the following may be usefully incorpora.ted in the stated purposes of IHRFs: 
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(a) To fund specific research and training programmes in developing 
countrieP or regions \Jith purposes limited to develnpment of 
personnel capable of r::o:nducting developing-country-oriented 
technological development 7 
(b) To fund other specific research and training institutions in 
developing countries or regions; 
(c) To provide general support for research on the development of 
developing country technologies; 
(d) To provide general support for educational institutions in 
a_eveloping countries; and 
(e) To receive funds from private voluntary contributors (individuals 
and juridical persons), from the proceeds of any International Brain 
Drain Tax discussed in chapter III below, and from proceeds of any 
assessments levied directly on the governments of the developed 
countries as discussed in chapter IV bel0\1. 
30. These purposes are directly related to the principal motivations behind 
the drive to mitigate the causes and adverse consequences of the brain drain -
the moral obligations of PTK migrants and the countries and organizations where 
and for which they work; the losses suffered by the developing countries; and 
the need to reduce the brain drain flm, by such measures as reorienting research 
and education in the developing countries. 
B. Kinds of tax incentives or benefits for contributors to IHRFs 
31. Private individuals and business firms in recognition of the obligations 
for real economic benefits Teceived from tb-, brain drain flou can be expected 
to make voluntary contributions to IHRFs designed to achieve agreed purposes. 
The amounts of these contributions might in turn be significantly enhanced by 
offering tax advantages to contributors. In so far as these advantages to 
taxpayers might cause some revenue loss to tbe developed countries, the estimated 
amount of sucb loss might properly be regarded as a contribution by the developed 
country rather tban by the taxpayer. The expectation is that this sacrifice of 
tax revenue by the developed country uill induce contributions by taxpayers 
which exceed, by more than the sacrifice, the contributions tbey would have made 
to IHRFs without the tax incentive. There is no easy way of knowing, however, 
whether or not the excess will occur or hou large it might be. 'j/ 
32, The remainder of this section examines types of tax incentives for 
contributions and some of the range of existing practices. Studies of existing 
5./ See N. Feldstein, "The Income Tax and Charitable Contributions",· 
28 National Ta.'< Journal, 81-100; 209-226, March and July 1975, and see also, 
H,H. Hochman and J .D. Rodgers, "The Optimal Tax Treatment of Charitable 
Contributions", 30 Natione,l Tax Journal 1, March 1977. 
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tax incentives for contributions to philanthropic institutions appear in the 
Cahiers of the Intc,:-national Fiscal AssocL-tion §/ and the documents produced 
in 1970-1971 as a 1·esul t of the efforts of the International Standing Conference 
on Philanthropy (IIITERPHIL) a Geneva-based association of philanthropic 
organizations.]/ 
1. Tax deductions 
33, Individual taxpayers in some developed countries (e.g. the United States, 
the United Kingdom PJld tbe Netherlands) are allowed to deduct from their 
texable income the amounts contributed to qualified charitable organizations, 
subject to a limit 1 such as 20 per cent or 30 per cent of their income. 
Amounts contributed in excess of the limit are not deductible from income. 
The the individual I s income tbe higher the rate of tax paid on marginal 
increments. of income under the progressive income tax systems prevailing in 
developed countries today. The ref ore, the greater the income, the larger will 
be the tax sav realized from the to deduct a charitable 
contribution. Put another vay 9 the greater the taxpayer's income the 
will be the tax inducement to give more to qualified institutions 1 such as 
International Human Resource Funds. For those wi ,:;h higher incomes the deduction 
approach is a tax incentive than the credit approach discussed below. 
2 . Tax credits 
34. A tax incentive ma.y be given in the form of a direct subtraction from 
income tax otherwise due rather than. a subtraction from income before calculating 
the tax. This form of incentive is usually called a tax credit or simply a 
credit. The amount might be, for example, 20 per cent of the amount donated to 
a International Human Resource Fund. For a person in the 20 per cent rate 
bracket of income taxation, this credit uould be equivalent to the tax saved by 
allowing a deductirin from income for the el"tire amount of a $100 donation. 
For a person in thL 30 per cent bracket, a deduction of $100 ,,.rould produce a 
benefit of f/30, ,1hile a tax credit of 20 per cent of the $100 donation would 
produce a tax ·benefit of only $20. Tax credits give equal tax benc,fits to 
virtually all taxpayers contributing the same amounts. Por the same amount 
donated a tax deduction gives 2. larger tax benefit to higher income taxpayers 
than ·louer income taxpayers; at tbe same time, the deduction gives more 
incentive to higher income to give larger amounts. 
§/ Cahiers de Droit Fiscal International (Studies on International Fiscal 
La\1), Volume 54b: 11 The possibilities and disadvantages of extending national 
tax reduction measures, if any, to foreign scientific, educational or 
charitable institutions 11 • 
]/ For example i see INTERPHIL (International Standing Conference on 
Philanthropy), Draft European Convention on the Tax Treatment in Respect of 
Certain Non-Profit Organizations, Report presented to the (.;ouncil of Europe, 
March 1971, Strasboui0 g. 
3. Combinations of deductions and credits 
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35. The taxpayer could be given the choice, under specified limitations, of 
either deducting his donation from his income or of crediting a percentage of 
his donation against his tax liability. At the present time, the United States 
gives this option to individuals for donations to political parties or 
candidates for political office, but the maximum credit is $25 (i.e. 50 per cent 
of donations up to $50), and the lllr-J.ximum deduction is $100. For any taxpayer 
\-Those tax bracket exceeds 25 per cent the deduction may be advantageous if he 
id shes to give more than $50 for political contributions. 
36. An internationally proposed scheme could adopt a carefully chosen set of 
limits on credits and deductions, giving the taxpayer a choice betueen 
deducting or crediting, in an attempt to optimize or in any event increase the 
amounts donated to IHRFs by persons at all income levels. 
4. Business firms 
37. A number of business firms, from the large transnational corporations to 
small professional firms, benefit from employing FTKs and would be willing to 
make contributions to IHRFs. Such contributions might ·be induced and increased 
by allowing deductions or giving credits. The United States allows deductions 
for contributions to qualified charitable organizations provided the 
contributions do not exceed 5 per cent of the firm I s net income. The Si·1iss 
National Government also allows business corporations to deduct small amounts 
of charitable contributions as bu::;iness expenses. For some countries it may be 
expected that business firms could deduct reasonable amounts of contributions 
to International Human Resource Funds as business expenses in the nature of 
research and development expenses which may ultimately result in increased 
business profits. 
38. At any rate business firms are a proper focus of attention for the scheme 
since many of them are direct beneficiaries of brain drain from the developing 
countries. 
5. International civil servants 
39. While a number of United nations or other international employees may feel 
morally persuaded to make contributions to International Hu.inan Resource Funds 
(witness the Geneva-based United Nations employees' 1 per cent fund for 
development), the amounts of these contributions might be significantly increased 
if matched in some way by adjustments in the complex scheme for compensating 
such employees. For example, if a brain drain tax is adopted and extended to 
international civil servants, so as to burden their net base salaries, then a 
credit might be given against this tax for a portion of voluntary contributions 
made to IHRFs. The credit might range from 20 per cent to 50 per cent of the 
amount of the donation depending upon the particular employee I s 0 staff 
assessment". 
6 • Earmarking 
40. The motivation to give larger amounts to IHRFs might well be stimulated by 
allowing contributors to designate or earmark thei:i. contributions for 
expenditure on certain projects or in certain countries or both. Smaller tax 
incentives m~y be needed to induce a given level of donations if the donors 
have some choice in designating the use of the amounts donated. Some IHBFs 
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(in UNICEF, for example) might offer a range of project 2nd location choices 
and even offer opportunities to donors to help design projects. Other Funds 
might be specialized by country or type of project, so that contributors make 
their choices by selecting their preferred Fund. 
41. Precedent' :for earmarking of contributions already exists within the 
United Nations family in the op2rations of UJ:HCEF. Donors may earmark their 
donations for particular objectives, projects, and countries on the UNICEF 
programme agEnda. 
42. Giving donors an influence over project design and location may offer 
ne1.1 opportuniti.es for 0:q)erim::mtc,tion in dealing 1-1ith the cntir·e complex of 
brain drain related problems. 
7. Existing practices in the developed and developing countries 
43. As indicated earlie1', some surveys of practices with Tespect to tax 
incentives for contributions to recognized voluntary funds have been made by 
private international groups. These surveys need to be examined and extended 
in order to bring to light the full variety of available techniques in giving 
tax incentives for charitable contributions as well as the prevailing extent 
and level of such incentives. For examr,lei the tax provision of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, uhich permits churches to have taxpayers who are 
rnPmbers of churches pay up to 10 per cent of their income tax li2,bility for the 
support of religion, needs to be ·examined as a possible technique to be 
recommended for use in certain countries. '§/ A developing country suffering 
substantially from brain drain might find such a technique helpful and adaptable 
for the provision of sums to an Intem2tional Human Resource Fund iri th 
objectives especially tailored to solving that country's problems. 
c. Eligibility for tax incentives 
44. One of the potentially more important advantages of the voluntary approach 
to providing revenue for International Human Res01.1.rce Funds is that eligibility 
for the tax incentives for voluntary contributions to.such Funds need not be 
limited to the class of persons designated as PTKs. Any person, organization, 
or country concernecl about or interested in de2.ling with the brain drain proble:n 
could make contributions i a.rid most of them could be eligible for one of tbe 
tax incentive allowances. Eligibility may be virtually unlimited e.s long as 
organizational design and regulation of IHF§s is adequate to the task of 
preventing abuses in their spending pattec~1s. 
D. The problem· of ttremittances 11 
45. A number of per.sons from the developing countries living in the developed 
countries or working abroad aa international civil servants remit sums to 




See Harvard LaH School International Tax Program, World Tax Series: 
in the Federal Republic of Germany (prepared by Henry J. Gumpel), 
Clea.ring House, 2nd edition, Chicago, Illinois, 1969, para. 12/1.8. 
TD/B/C. 6/AC. 4/7 
page 13 
might be used for solving brain problems and might be regarded as 
satisfying the moral obligations of FTKs or as providing flows of money 
which in part compensated for losses incurred by the drain. Will 
these remittances be curtailed arid. shifted to tax-induced donations? 
Will such shifts be desirable? Can they be detected and Or 
should it be assumed that such remittances are so personal that they 
are unlikely to be affected substantially the development of International 
Human Resource Funds? 
46. There are no simple answers to these questions and more research is 
needed. But it may be worth noting that much of the remittence f101;1 comes 
from the unskilled group of migrants. 1.1/hile this group is not covered by 
the present study, it may be safely expected that the proposals discussed here 
a.re unlikely to affect the flou of remittances. 
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Chapter II 
Leg.:_,l and administrative as2ects of bra.in dra.:.,1 taxes 
47. This chapter analyses various approaches to levying _a supplementary tax. on 
the income earned in the developed countries by individuals who emigTate from t:,he 
developing countries. Section A provides as a background to the subsequent 
discussion a brief introduction to international income tax rules. Sections B 
and C discuss two possible a.pproaches to applying a supplementary tax on the brain 
drain~ a tax levied by the developing country and a tax levied by the deveJoped 
country. The discussion highlights the legal and administrative problems of 
implementation. 
A. Jurisdictional issues in general 
48. Many of the legal issues raised by a brain drain tax a.re jurisdictional in 
nature. That is, they involve the rules governing the extent of a country's 
taxing power. At the outset, therefore, it is important to consider the scope 
of these powers. 
49, In general, countries have exercised self-restraint in asserting their tax 
jurisdiction. The practicalities of enforcement and the fear that a broad 
assertion of jurisdiction might offend foreign governments have kept countries 
from exercising their taxing powers in wa:ys that ,10uld create conflicts among 
countries. Accordingly certain pa.tterns of taxation have evolved that a.re 
acceptable a.s a ma.tter of international custom. 2/ Some aspects of the brain 
drain tax, may, however, go beyond existing practice and raise questions 
concerning the limits of a country's tax. jurisdiction. Since the outer limits 
of a country's jurisdiction are often not clearly defined, 1SJ./ only sketchy and 
tentative answers can be given to some questions at this stage. 
50. In order effectively to assert jurisdiction to tax incomEo, a country must 
rely on some minimum connexion or nexus, between itself and the income being 
taxed. 11/ In terms of this nexus, tax systems can be classified into two ma.jar 
groups: schedular systems and global (or unitary) systems. Under a pure 
<J/ Many countries are parties to bilateral tax treaties that modify each 
country's usual pattern of taxation. An objective of these tax treaties is to 
reach agreement on the acceptable scope of ea.ch country's tax jurisdiction. 
Non-tax. conventions can also affect a country 1 s tax jurisdiction in special 
situations. The International Convention on Diplomatic Relations, for example, 
provides a tax. exemption in the country of employment for income earned by foreign 
diplomats. 
1Q/ Compe.re Martin Horr, "Jurisdiction to Tax and International Income", 
Tax Law Review, Vol. 17, 1962, p. 431, with Stanford Ross, 11United States Taxation 
of Aliens and Foreign Corporations~ The Foreien Investors Tax Att of 1966 and 
Related Developments", Tax Law Review, Vol. 22, 1967, p. 363, 
ll/ Norr, op. cit. p. 432. 
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schedular system, the jurisdictional connexion is the sources of the income. 11/ 
Only income from domestic sources is taxed; no jurisdiction is asserted over 
income from foreign sources. Since all countries tax income from domestic 
sources, any country that uses a schedular system - that taxes only a_omestic 
income - exercises the most limited form of tax jurisdiction. Feu countries so 
restrict themselves. 12/ 
51. In a global system, an addi tiona.l jurisdictional com1exion is the personal 
status of the taxpayer. Jurisdiction is thus based on two independent factors; 
the source of the income and the·status of the taxpayer. W Under most global 
systems, residence is the connexion relied on in asserting tax jurisdiction over 
individuals. In a few countries, including the United States; Mexico and 
11/ Ibid., p. 434. 
12/ A country might limit itself to taxing only domestic income if the 
amount of foreign income were insignificant. Unfortunately, as foreign income 
becomes increasingly significant, these countries sometimes find themselves locked 
into their earlier approaches. Other countries may wish to tax foreign income 
but may not have the administrative capability of e:n.forcing a. tax on foreign 
income. A small number of countries deliberately exempt foreign income to 
increase their attractiveness as tax havens. 
W The global approach focuses on an individual 1 s abi1ity-to..:-pay, as 
measured by his totaJ incom.e; .regardless of i.ts. source. Sincro foreign income· 
increases the individual's ability-to-pay, it 1.rnuld be inconsistent to exempt it 
from taxation. By compa.rison the schedular approach focuses on classes of 
income. Different classes of income (wages, business profits, interest) are 
commonly taxed at different rates and ,.ri th different exemptions and deductions. 
The personal status of the taxpayer is sometimes relevant in determining the rate 
applied to the income. See, "Schedular and Global Income Taxes", in R.N. Bird 
and O. Oldman (eds.), Readings on Taxation in Developing Countries, 
The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1967. 
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the Philippines, citizenship alone is a sufficient connexion. 12..i These countries, 
however, also tax nrm-citizens who a.re residents. That is, either status -
citizenship or residence - is sufficient for the assertion of global tax 
jurisdiction, though the va.st majority of taxpayers are both citizens and 
residents. Countries using a global system tax all income of their citizens and 
residents, regardless of its geographic source. In other words, income from 
foreign sources is taxed a.long ,Jith domestic income. The difference between 
taxing on a. residence ba.sis and taxing on a citizenship basis can be illustrated 
'oy considering taxpayer A, who is a citizen of country "X". Assume A moves 
abroad a.nd is no longer considered by X to be 2, resident. If X taxes on the 
basis of citizenship, A's change of residence will be irrelevant and X will tax A 
not only on income earned ,Jithin X, but also on any income earned abroad. By 
comparison, if X taJCes only on the basis of residence, it will no longer assert 
jurisdiction over A on the basis of his personal status. Thus X will not tax A 
on income earned abroad. X will tax A, however, on income received from sources 
Hithin X. In this case, the source of the income 1.s a sufficient connexion with 
the country to warrant the assertion of its tax jurisdiction. 
52. Most income tax systems are hybrids, employing some combination of the global 
and schedular concepts. A global system is probably used more often by the 
developed countries, a schedular system more often by the developing countries. 
12/ See Douglas Sherbaniuk, Henry Hutcheon, and Pearley Brissenden, 
"Liability for Tax-Residence, Domicile or Citizenship?'; in Canadian Tax Foundation, 
Report of Proceedings of the Seventeenth Annual Tax Conference, Toronto, 1964, 
P• 315, 
Administratively, it is probably more difficult to assert jurisdiction on 
the basis of citizenship than on the basis of residency. Although the definition 
of residency varies among countries, a person will nomally lose his residence 
status if he is outside cf the country for a prolonged period of time. The 
longer the individual is out of the country, the more difficult t4e administrative 
problems of locating the taxpayer and verifying his income and ded~ctions. 
Countries taxing on fhe basis of citizenship must continue to make these efforts, 
regardless of ho\-7 long the taxpayer is outside ·of the country (or regardless of 
whether the taxpayer has ever been within the country). 
The United States is probably more successful in administering its 
citizenship jurisdiction than other countries would be. Many Americans who work 
abroad are employed by United States corporations, and this eases the Internal 
Revenue Service's (IRS) enforcement problems. Moreover, it is more than likely 
that many Americans alternate periods a,broad with periods within the United States. 
Knowing they a.re going to return to the United Sta.tes at some future date helps 
quench inclinations to ignore United Sta.tes ta.,r obligations while a.broad. Also, 
the IRS stations personnel abroad as part of its office of Internation,3,l 
Operations. The IRS' s presence abroad undoubtedly encourages taxpayer compliance. 
Finally, Americans do ~ot easily relinquish their citizenship; thus tax induced 
renunciations are uncommon. In limited circumstances, tax induced renunciations 
may be ignored by the United States for purposes of assessing tax liability. 
(See Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 877). 
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The trend in the developing countries, however, is to move toward a more global 
approach. li/ Few if any developing countries remain which rely on a strictly 
and narrowly define'. schedula.r approach. 
53. To gain a perspective on some of the subsequent presentation, it is useful 
to realize that countries using a global approach already assert tax jurisdiction 
over individuals working a.broad. Although the primary motivation for adopting 
the global approach was not to tax the brain drain, these countries already tax 
PTKs as part of their general assertion of tax jurisdiction over all residents 
and citizens a.broad. Ha.ving an existing legal fra.me.rork for taxing individuals 
a.broad is different, however~ from effectively administering such a tax. Most 
countries find that the problems of enforcing a. tax on indi.viduals abroad are 
considerable. Furthermore, the type of emigrant who comprises the heart of the 
brain drain may not neatly fall within traditional definitions of residency, or 
he may think nothing of renouncing his developing country citizenship, thereby 
- -.raising jurisdictional issues. These problems a.re explored in section B. 
B. Developing country taxation of emi~rant PTKs~ 
1. Jurisdictional issues 
54. In order to levy a tax. on the part of income earned abroad by an emigrant 
PTK, the developing country must assert jurisdiction on the basis of the personal 
status of the. PTK. If_ the developing country relies on residence as its 
jurisdictional nexus, as do most global type countries, the jurisdictional issue 
involved in taxing the PTK is the definition of "resident 11 • 
55, The definition of 11resident" varies markedly from country to country. 
Some countries follow specific rules that define residence in terms of the period 
of time a person has been inside or outside the country, thereby avoiding inquiry 
into less objective factors. Other countries decide the question on an almost 
ad hoc basis, with 7 i..ttle guidance from sta',ltes. Often, a r,mbination of the 
two approaches is aaopted. 11.I 
1.§/ As the income tax becomes more significant in the fiscal structure of 
a country, problems of measuring and comparing individual's abilities-to-pay become 
increasingly important. Attention logically shifts to a taxpayer's total income, 
regardless of source. In response to these concerns, a country can be expected 
to move in the direction of a global system. Pressure to adopt a global system 
will be increas_ed as foreign investment grows, since a country would want to tap 
the revenue potential available from taxing foreign income. Moreover, if foreign 
income were not taxed, inveotors would have an inducement to invest abroad, 
aggravating domestic ca.pi tal shorta.ges. 
11./ At one end of the spectrum are countries that define residency in.terms 
that suggest domicile, e.g., a physical presence in the country coupled with a,n 
intention to remain for an indefinite period. Once this status has been achieved, 
it may be difficult for the taxpayer to shed it. At the other end of the 
spectrum are definitions of residency phrased in terms of business connexion with 
the country, regardless of whether or not the individual is physically present. 
A country may have one set of rules for determining when an individual ceases to 
be a. resident. For illustrations of the approaches some countries use, see 
Harvard Law School International Tax Program, World Tax Series (hereinafter WTS): 
Taxation in .Australia., Little, Brown· and Co., Boston, 1958, 5/1 i WTSg Taxation 
in the Federal Re ublic of German .. Commerce Clearing House, Inc., Chica.go, 1963, 
2 2; WTS: Taxation in Sweden, Little, Brown and Co., Boston, 1959, 5/1. The 
definition of resident for citizens or nationals may be different from that for 
a.liens. See WTS: Taxation in Colombia., Commerce Clea.ring House, Inc., Chicago, 
1964, 11/1.2. -
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56, Whatever the approach, the ba-c;ic question is: at uho,t point does a PTK 
\·TOrking abroad cease to be 2. resident of th0 developing country? The factors 
that most countriec, i/OUlcl consider ar2 the '_ntent of the PTK '.:i th respect tc his 
being abroad, the length of his stay abroad;, and the nature of his contacts vith 
both countries. ~ For ex2rnple, '" FI'K ,,ho U8.S sent ab1·oad by his employer for 
short-term training Hould cle2,rly remain a Tesident of the de"Jeloping country. 
In contrast, PTKs vho h2.ve migr2,ted Fa.broad Etre the least likely to all within the 
usual concepts of residence. 
57. In order to assert jurh1d.ictio:c1 over migrant ?I'Ks, the developing country 
has t\TO options. _ The first i,; to defir;.e residence in terms of a person I s prior 
contacts with the developing country, even though 2.11 these contacts may have 
been severed long ago. This definition of residence F('Uld be broader than that 
so fa.r adopted by any country. As explained in section A, 2uch a broa,d 
assertion of jurisdiction could not be said to violate international law,--but 
because it would be out of the mainstrear1 of international c-ustom and practice, 
two serious problems could arise. One is that the developed country might refuse 
to recognize the developing country I s rlefini tion 1 especially since it ,rould 
-conflict with the developed country's claim cf residence over the PTK. A 
developed cow1try that viewed the developing co;intry' s assertion of jurisdiction 
as illegitimate uould obviously not co-operate vith the developing country in 
policing the tax on PTKs. 'rhe other is that the developing country's claim of 
residence would make little sense to a ?TIC 1:ho had cut 211 his ties with his 
country of origin. He might therefore ignore the claim and refuse to comply 
voluntarily 1:ith the tax. 
50. In view of the sensitive issues involved, an unorthodox definition of 
residence is unlikely to sway public opinion in favour of the tax. Indeed, in 
terms of public acceptance it seen,s crucial that the supplementa.ry i;ax conforms 
as closely as possible to existing p2,tterns of taxation. Therefore, a more 
fruitful option is for the developing country to follow the pattern established 
by the United State, Mexico, and the Phili/pines, and assert jurisdiction on 
the additional basis of citizenship. 1..2./ 3ince these three countries apply 
citizenship jurisdiction uniformly to all citizens~ the developing country could 
~ Ascertaining residency is often a more difficult inquiry than that of 
ascertaining citizenship. But enforcing a tax on the basis of citizenship will 
pose greater problems, since the taxpayer ma.y have little, if any contact with 
the country. 
1.2/ In some countries, the taxation of the foreign earnings of a non-
resident citizen may conflict with constitutional doctrines proscribing 
legislation ha.ving an e:xtra-terri torial effect. l<'or example, some Ca11adian 
constitutional-law scholars felt that, prior to 1931, Canada was precluded from 
enacting legislation having an extra-territorial effect. In 1931, the Canadia..r:1 
Parlia."llent acceded to the Statute of Westminster, which expressly authorized such 
legish.tion. The Statute of vTestrninster clearly established the power to tax. 
non-resident citizens on their foroign income, though Cana.do has never chosen to 
exercise this power. (See Sherbaniuk, Hutcheon, and Brissenden, op.cit., p. 316). 
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not limit citizenship jurisdiction to just PTKs without encountering serious 
problems. The singling out of emigrant PTKs for special treatment, .assuming this 
was consistent with the developing country's domestic law, would raise delicate 
problems under international law. '£2/ ·These problems, like those arising from 
an unorthodox definition of residence, W would present obstacles to obtaining 
the administrative assistance of the developed countries and to obtaining the 
voluntary compliance of the PTKs. Moreover, other reasons exist for the 
developing country not to iimit its citizenship jurisdiction to PTKs (see B,5 
below and section A of the appendix). 
59, Unlike an unorthodox definition of residence, the adoption of citizenship 
jurisdiction is within the mainstream of international custom and practice. 
Certainly the United States would find it avkward to criticize the developing 
countries for modeTling themselves on its 0vm pattern of taxation, despite the 
difference in motives.· The precedent provided by Mexico and the Philippines 
should also help to silence public criticism. 
2. Renunciation of citizenship by the FTK 
60. The developing country's assertion of jurisdiction on the basis of 
citizenship might induce a P'l1K to renounce his citizenship in order to avoid 
developing country taxation. Though one result would be a revenue loss to the 
developing country, another, more important, consequence would be a lowering of 
the probability that the PTK would eventually return to the developing country. 
Imposing an income tax on non-resident citizens might therefore not be in the 
developing country's best interests to the extent that it resulted in wholesale 
renunciations of citizenship. 
61. Could the developing country ignore a PTKs renuncia.tion of citizenship, a.t 
least for the purpose of asserting tax jurisdiction? Again, international law 
offers little guidance since no country has attempted such a broad assertion of 
tax jurisdiction. 'l1/ But two cases can be distinguished. An individual who 
renounces his citizenship can either acquire a ne\·J citizenship or else become 
stateless. The developing country's assertion of tax jurisdiction over the PTK 
once he has acquired citizenship in the developed cmmtry would raise the same 
problems as an unorthodox definition of residence. In contrast, any developing 
country policy that discourages persons from becoming stateless in order to avoid 
'£2/ The developing countries domestic la1,r may also prevent the singling out 
of PTKs for special t2x treatment. 
21/ An assertion of citizenship jurisdiction by the developing country might 
also be viewed as creating a conflict between the h;o countries. The short 
answer is that countries accept certain coriflicts as being legitimate and 
inevitable. The conflict between citizenship jurisdiction and residence 
jurisdiction is, by custom and practice considered acceptable. The conflict 
created by an orthodox r!.efinition of resident v1ould, however, not be considered 
legitimate. 
'l1/ 'fhe United States has a provision designed to discourage citizens from 
giving up their citizenship and moving a.broad in order to avoid United States tax. 
(Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 877), The special tax. imposed on expatriates 
extends only to their United States investment income and income effectively 
connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States. No 
attempt is made to tax their foreign earnings that have no connexion with the 
United States. 
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taxation. Fould seem rec1.sonable. 2J/ Thus one approach the developing country 
could would be to recognize the :2TKs renunciation of citizenship only if he 
obtained a ne'r cit • 'lJJ In the ca.so of "' ?TK vho had emigrated to the 
United St::ites, the developing country could levy its tax for at least five· years, 
uhich is the length of time an immigr2.,nt must normally wait before applying for 
United States citizenship. 
62. If the developir.g country 2sserh, tax jurisdicti:Jn over the PTK during' his 
first five years in the United. St2,tes, the PTK uould have nothing to ga.in from 
renouncing his citizenship. From the developing country's point of view, hm·1ever, 
limit taxation to a five-year period rna,y reduce potential revenues. The l?TKs 
early year:2. in a developed country might not be productive in terms of income, 
especia.lly if he spends pa.rt of the til:le in college. Ji'urthermore, the PTK may 
be able to reduce his income during this period by working- under a deferred 
compensation agreement. 
63, Devising rules to minimize ta.x avo1.da.nce through renunciation of citizenship 
is difficult, and no one nolution appears to be completely satisfactory. This 
problem might best be handled by an internation2.l agency, like the United Nations, 
for exa.mple a.s possibly the most appropriate body to develop rules for taxing 
PTKs vho have surrendered their citizenship. 
6~. The problem of wholesa.le renunciations may, hovever, prove to be a. 
academic one. A supplementary a_eveloping country tax that imposes only a modest 
burden on the ?TK is not likely to result in renunciation. RenU,nciation would 
also be unattra.cti ve to a PTK 1:.rho Hi shed to retain close family links uith his 
country of origin, or to a ;JTK who wa.s uncertain about his future plans. 
Moreover, cultural and social patterns a,re likely to influence a PTK 1 s decision; 
the strength of his ties to the developing country might oubreigh the tax savings 
from renunciation. 
3. Relief from double tax~dion 
65. International double taxa.tion cen result when 2 taxpayer or his income has 
,jurisdictional connexions with more than one country. 2.§./ Since a developed 
country will tax a "J?TK on inco,ne earned ·1-ri thin the country, double taxation ,rill 
occur if the developing country alcm taxes the J?rIL 
_gj/ See Paul Weis, r;'I'he United Nations Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness1:, 1961, International and Com-iJarati ve Lm1 Qua.rterly, Vol. 11 
(1962) p. 1073, 
W Such an approach vould be sir.cilar to tho United StateG Gammon Law rule 
that a person does not lose one clomicile until he has acquired another. 
£2.I Under certain conditions (e.g. marriage to an .American citizen), the 
waiting period may be less th2 ... n five years. 
Professor Bha,guati s that the tax be converted into a capitalized sum 
at the time of a change in nationality. It is, however, questionable whether the 
United States could constitutionally help the developing country collect this sum. 
See footnote 41 below. 
2f2/ International double taxation commonly a.rises when one country taxes an 
individual on the basis of residency or citizenship and another country taxes the 
individual on the s of the source of the income. Double taxation can also 
arise if two or more countries consider the taxpayer as their resident or national, 
or consider the source of the same it em of income a.s being within each of their 
territories, 
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66. Suppose a ::?TIC has taxable income of US $20,000 derived entirely from 
employment within the United States. Assume that the United States tax would be 
levied at an effective rate of 25 per cent, resulting in a United States tax 
liability of US $5,000. I;f the developing country levies its regular income tax 
on the sa,me base, 'll/ US $20,000, at a.YJ. effective rate of 45 per cent, the 
developing country tax lia,bility would be US $9,000. The total tax burden on 
the PTK 1 s earnings vould be US $14,000 (US $5,000 plus US $9,000), for an over-all 
effective rate of 70 per cent. 
67. As the example illustrates, the burden of double taxation can be quite 
onerous. Mc,st countries that tax foreign income therefore use some type of 
foreign tax credit mechanism to provide relief. W Among the coimtries using 
the credit method described below are~ Canada, Gre_ece, The Federal Republic of 
Germany, India, Israel, Ja,pa.n, Mexico_, Pakistan, the Philippines, Turkey, 
the United Kingdom and the United States. Other countries may agTee to grant a 
credit for taxes paid to countries 1·1ith which they have tax treaties. The 
United States, for example, requires its tax treaty partners to grant a credit 
to their residents for income tax paid to the United States~ 
68. A foreign tax credit is a unilateral method of eliminating double taxation 
by allowing the country of source the prior claim on the income. In its simplest 
form, a credit mechanism wo.uld require that the taxpayer compute his tax liability 
2nd then take as a credit aga.inst that liability the a.mount of any foreign tax 
pa.id on the income. The PTK in the example vould take a credit for the 
United States (the country of source) tax of US $5,000, thereby lowering his 
developing country tax liability from US $9,000 to US $4,000. From the 
United States point of view, the PTK has no foreign income and thus cannot take a 
credit age.inst his United States tax liability. In other words, from the 
United St2tes point of viev, the developing country has no prior claim on the 
PTK 1 s income since the developing country is not the country of source. The final 
result is that the PTK pays tax to the United St;ates at a rate of· 25 per cent and 
to the developing country at a rate of 20 per cent. W 
']]/ The developing country uill determine the PTK 1 s taxable income according 
to its own definition. This determination of the PTK's taxable income does not 
have to correspond with that of the United States. 
W Other methods of eliminating 6r reducing double taxation include 
granting an exemption for all foreign source income (or perhaps limiting the 
exemption only in ca.ses llhere the foreign income Fas subject to a. foreign tax), 
granting a deduction for foreign taxes, or applying a reduced rate of tax to 
foreign income. 
£l/ The text greatiy simplifies the credit device. Questions that must be 
answered in designing a. credit device include: What types of foreign taxes a~e 
creditable? What kinds of limitations a.re needed to prevent the foreign tax 
credit from reducing the country of residence I s tax on domestic income? How 
should double taxation be defined? Hov should foreign income be defined? The 
United States has developed a sophisticated set of rules that govern the use of 
its foreign tax credit. See, Elisapeth Owens, IJ.'he Foreign Tax Credit (Cambridge, 
:VlA~ Harvard Law School, International 'l'ax Program, 1961). 
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69. In short, as long as the developing country tax ra.te is higher than the 
United States r:s.te, the credit results in t;:,,x being paid to the developing country 
at a, rate equal to the excess of the effective developing com.try rate over the 
effective United States rn,te (the 20 per cent finaJ. result in the example). As 
long as the PTK 1 s earnings are high by developing country standards, the effective 
developing country tax rate uill probably exceed the effective United Sta.tes rate, 
and it will therefore receive some tax revenue from the ?TK. Should the 
United States ra.te be higher then the developing country rate, however, the credit 
for taxes paid tc the United States 1rill exceecl a.nd thus cancel the developing 
country tax liability. If the rates in the example Here reversed, the ?TK would 
pay US $9,000 in Udted Sta.tes tax, and credit this fcreign tax against his 
developing country liabiJ.ity of US $5,0(\j, Under these circumstances, the 
developing countr,r would receive no ta,x revenue from the ?TK. 
70. If the United States uished to increase unile.terally the amount of revenue 
collected by the developing country, it could deviate from longstanding practice 
and g-rant a credit for the developing country.tax. In the preceding example where 
the United States tax iJa,s initially US $5,000 and the developing country tax was 
US $9,000, a. credit for the developing country tax would eliminate the 
United States tax-liability and the developing country vould collect the full 
US $9,000. The credit uould thus have the effect of transferring Ufi $5,000 from 
the United States to the developing country. Where the r·ates were reversed, and 
the PTK had an initial United States tax liability of US $9,000 and an initiaJ. 
developing country ta.x liability of US $5,000, a credit for the deveJ.oping country 
tax would reduce the ?TK 1 s United States liability to US $4,000 and ,10uld allow 
the developing country to collect its tax liability of US $5,000 without increasing 
the overall tax burden on the PTK. Again, the credit would have the effect of 
trarisferring US $5,000 from the United States to the developing country. Granting 
a credit for a developing country tax levied on income Hhose source was ~-,i thin 
the United States would logically have nothing to do with a rational policy of 
relieving double taxation and could be vie,,red as simply a means of transferring 
revenue to the deve:i oping country; in othe ,, words, a foreign ;iu programme 
carried out through a technical change in the rules governing the foreign tax 
credit. Using the foreign tax credit f0r channelling foreign aid may not be 
unprecedented, however. During the 1950s, the United States Treasury Department 
took the position that levies ir::rposed on United States oil producers by the Arab 
oil producing countries uere t2.xes rather than roya,l ties. J3y characterizing the 
levies as taxes, ,,rhich ccula. be credited ag.s,inst United States taxes, rather than 
a.s roya.lties, which could only be deducteJ as a business expense, the result was 
to transfer ta.x revenue from the United States to the oil producing countries 
,,ii thout increasing the overal1 ta.x liability on the producers. Ori tics argue 
that the levies were properly royalties but were incorrectly characterized as 
taxes in order to aid the oil producing countries 2,t a time uhen more explicit 
forms of foreign aid would have been unacceptable. The royalty versus tax 
issue is currently under re-examination in the United States. 
71. If the goal of the developing countries is to mBximize revenue, th€Y ha.ve the 
option of not allowing a. credit for foreign taxes. Noreover, no 1)rinciple of 
international law requires a, country to provide relief from the burden of double 
taxation. 29./ Indeed, if a developing -~ouncry 1c1Emted to increase 1;he economic 
cost of the 1?TK 1 s d.ecision to work abroad, it would adopt no relief provisions 
,-,ha.tsaever. The lack of any relief provisions might, havrever, be counter-
productive in a revenue oensc, because it would. encourage the PTK to evade or 
a.void the developing country ta.x. 
:ldJ Norr, op.cit., p. 438, 
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72, In deciding whether or not to adopt some method of relief, the developing 
country has· to consi1-er the a.tti tude of the host developed country, especially if 
it will need assistance from the developed country in enforcing its tax:. The 
United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, 
all of which use the foreign tax credit as a mea.ns of relief, might not be willing 
to help enforce a tax uhose burden they deemed excessive, If the developed 
countries were sensitive to the effect of the developing country tax. on emigration, 
the best course for the developing country might be to adopt some method of relief 
as a precondition to requesting administrative assistance from the developed 
countries. 
73. The credit mechanism eliminates only the burden resulting from double 
taxation. As the effective developing country rate in the example (45 per cent) 
indicates, the PTK 1 s income in the developed country makes him 2.ppea.r quite 
affluent by standards in the developing country. A salary that is considered 
to be no more than adequate by United States standards may well thrust the PTK 
into the developing country's upper tax brackets and a. developing country income 
tax that would be appropriate if the PTK were living in the country could border 
on being confiscatory when measured. against the cost of living in the developed 
country, .21./ Thus the relief afforded by the credit mechanism might not be 
sufficient. Instead, the developing country might consider adopting a special 
rate structure for taxing foreign income. (See B,5, below and Paxt C of the 
appendix.) 
4. Tax base 
74. The example used to illustrate the uorkings of the tax credit mechanism 
assumed that the PTK 1 s tax base, that is, his taxable income, was the same under 
both the developing country and United States la1-1. But the developing country 
will normally determine the PTK 1 s tax base under its domestic law. And just as 
the developing country's usual rate schedule may produce unsatisfactory results 
when applied to a. PTK working abroad, it may not be possible simply to apply the 
developing country's normal rules and principles governing income, deductions, 
ca.pi tal allowances, exemptions, 2nd so forth to a PTK working abroad. Rules that 
work reasonably well in the developing country may be totally inappropriate or 
have unintended consequences when a,pplied to unfamiliar transactions and business 
practices in the developed country. These issues are pursued in greater detail 
in the appendix, 
11,I The extension of a country's tax. system to foreign income can "be 
defended on grounds of tax neutrality, which requires that a country tax foreign 
income in the same manner as domestic income (with a. credit for foreign taxes). 
Decisions whether to invest abroad rather than domestically will thus be · 
unaffected by domestic tax conside:cations resulting in the efficient international 
allocation of capital. It is tempting to extrapolate from this case and argue 
that the extension of the developing country tax system to PTKs abroad maintains 
tax neutrality and economic efficiency. When a taxpayer resides a.broad, however, 
the principle of neutrality would tend to break down since the developing country 
tax rate schedules are designed in the context of the developing country's cost 
of living, salary levels, and income distribution. As the example in the text 
suggests, the developing country rates ma.y become coni'iscatory when applied to 
a PTK in the developed country unless, of course, combined with relief for 
double taxation. · 
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75. P..n entirely different approach, discussed in the following section, is for 
the developing country to use the developed country's tax base. W 
5. Rates of tax levied by a developing- country 
76. The amount of developing countr}' tax lia,bility has a strong bearing on 
taxpayer compliance, as well as on many of the other problems discussed above. 
Al though some PTKs may not co-operate with the developing country under any 
circumstances, the behaviour of most 11ill be influenced by the size of the 
developing conntry' s supplementary tax on their foreign ea,rnings. If the burden 
is not unreasonable, the PTK will be less likely to renounce his citizenship or 
use other means of evading or a,voicling the tax. Furthermore, the developed 
country may be more likely to assist the developing country in collecting the tax 
if the rate is low enough not to influence the PTK 1 s a.ecision to emigrate or 
constitute a. hardship Hhile he is living in the developed country. 'rhus 
considerable thought must be given to designing the developing country rate 
structure. 
77. The appendix provides a detailed discussion of the ap1,roaches avdlable in 
designing a rate schedule applicable to taxpayers abroad, One approach would be 
to ignore the PTK' s presence abroa,d a:r1d apply the developing country's normal, 
domestic tax rates. As Has illustrated a.bove, this approa.ch is likely to lead 
to an overall tax burden on the PTK that may be onerous by developed country 
standards, even if relief is provided through a, credit for taxes paid in the 
developed countries. 
78, A second approach would be to design a specia1 rate schedule applicable only 
to PTKs a.broad. Idea.Hy, this special schedule should take into account the 
Pl'K's tax liability in the developed country; therefore, a Geparate set of rates 
would have to be developed for each developed country. 
79, The most promiiing approach would see: to be for the dcv loping country to 
levy a surtax on the amount oi' the J?l'K 1 s tc:1.x liability in the developed country. 
Under this app:roa,ch, the P'J1I( ,,rould calculate his developed country tax liability 
in the usual way. To calculate his developing country tax, the J?TK would multiply 
his developed country liability by the amount of the surtax. If the developed 
country tax liability were US $1.000 and the rate of the surtax were 10 per cent, 
the developing country tax uould, be US )noo (U,S $1 ~ 000 X 10 per cent). 
80. The surtax may appear initially to be onJ.y a variation of the second 
approach, whereby a separate rate schedule is designed for ea.ch developed 
country. But the surtax differs in a, major respect. The separate rate 
schedules designed under i;he second approa.ch would a.pply to the PTK 1 s tax base 
as determined ,under the developing country 12,w. The surtax, hmrever, is a 
function of the developed country tax, which in turn is dependent on the developed 
country rules and principles governing the c2.lculation of the tax base: While 
the surtax approach may work satisfactorily with some, if not most PTKs, special 
cases could pose difficulties. (See Part B.l of the appendix.) 
32} Uot all developing countries use an income tax. Using the developed 
country's tax base would be especially attractive for these developing countries, 
since it avoids the necessity of designing their O'¼'Yl tax base. 
f. Administrative considerations 
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81. Policing a tax on resid.er..ts and citizens living abroad creates problems even 
for a sophisticated tax administration such a.s that of the United States. 
Since many developing countries la.ck an effective tax ccllection machinery, the 
assertion·of citizenship ,jurisdiction may cause severe enforcement problems. In 
countries plagued by low tax-payer mora.li ty and lacking experience in the taxation 
of foreign income, the problems 1,,.rill be compounded. 
82. A developing country using a pure schedular-ty-pe system will have hac1. no 
experience in taxing·foreign income. Furthermore, the reason the country uses 
a schedular-ty-pe system and taxes only domestic income may be that its tex 
2dministration is not capable of administering a globa1 system. A developing 
country usine!' a global-type system, however, will have had some experience in. 
taxing the foreign income of its residents. Despite this experience, it will 
find it harder to enforce a tax· on the foreign income of emigrant P1'Ks than on 
that of residents. 
83. The willingness of ?TKs to comply with the tax laws of their countries will 
depend on the loyalties that they feel. On the one hand, some l?TKs may feel a 
deep moral obligation to repay the developing country for the educational or other 
opportunities afforded them. On the other hand, ?TKs may constitute a most 
recalcitrant group of tax payers. Some may fail to see the equity aspect in a 
tax burden that, exceeds that of their colleagues in the developed country. 
Others, ,rhose prima.ry motive for leaving the developing country was to escape 
political, religious or social oppression may have no intention of contributing 
to the costs of a government or society with whose policies they disagree. Those 
forced to emigrate as a. result of the lack of professional opportunities in the 
developing country may also be opposed. Secure in the belief that the developing 
country does not have e2.sy access to their financial affairs in the developed 
country, certa,in T:''l'Ks may feel confident to file a tax return containing false 
infomation. Ind.Led, a PI1K who has cut all ties with his cc·c1.ntry of origin may 
see no need to file a return at all. 3J/ Obtaining accurate informa,tion about 
a '?TK's taxable income is the first problem a developing country faces in 
administering a tax on non-residents. Once the .?TK' s ta..-s.:- liability has been 
determined, the secor:d problem lies in collecting the amount owed. 
84. In order to obta.in the info:cmation necessary to access a recalcitrant PTK, 
the developing country may engage in some form of unilateral action. For example, 
a. developing country tax administrator could go to the developed country and 
conduct his own investigation. '11his approach is ob,:iously expensive; moreover, 
the developed country may regard the tax administrator's presence as an intrusion 
on its national sovereignty. For these reasons, unilateral action is rarely used 
unless Targe amounts of revenue. are involved. }4/ 
n/ The fa.ilure to receive returns from taxpayers abroad is a problem that 
plagues all countries. See John Surr 1 
11 Intertax: Intergovernmental Co-operation 
in ·raxationn, Harvard International Law Club Journal. Vol. 7, 1966, p. 203, 
24,/ ~- , p. 182. Internationci.l lav! may prohibit a country from exerting 
ony administrative activities within another country without special permission. 
See A. Radler, Corporate Taxation in the Common Market, Part IV, in Guides to 
European Taxation, Vol, II, (mimeograph), Amsterdam 9 p. IV-A."5• 
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85. A more effective and less expensive approach open to the developing country 
is to enlist the co-operation of the develc1ed country's tax cidministration. If 
the desired information is not already available, it will be easier for the 
developed country 1 s tax administration to make the appropriate investigation than 
for the developing country's. Furthermore, the PTK 1 s knowledge that the 
developing country can readily obtain the relevant information will encourage him 
to comply with the tax laws cf his country by filing an accurate return in the 
first place. 
86. The United States, like most developed countries, does not exchange tax 
information on an informal bn,sis. Information is exchanged only u..rider conditions 
specified in a tax treaty. The actual information exchanged varies from treaty 
to treaty. Certain readily available information, such as ~ list of foreign 
taxpayers receiving investrcent income from which United States taxes have been 
withheld, may be routinely exchanged, especially if such information ha.s already 
been compiled for United Stc1.tes tax purposec. Non-routine information, for 
example, information on a specific taxpayer, must be specia.lJ.y requested by a 
foreign governme~t and usually will be supplied only in certain limited 
circumstances. In pra.ctice, the number of individuals about whom information is 
exchangea is not large. Yi/ 
87. Once the ?TK's tax liability has been assessed, the developing country is 
faced with the problem of collecting the tax owed. The problem may be simplified 
if the PTK has assets within his country of origin held as security against his 
tax liability. But if the PTK has removed alJ. his assets to the developed 
country, the developing country has four options. It may (i) ignore the tax. owed 
until the PTK returns, if everi (ii) use non-tax measures as leverage to 
encourage payment of the tax; (iii) collect the taY through the developed 
country's courtsi or (iv) have all administrative assistance agreement with the 
developed country. 
88. The first o:pt~on p-rovict.es the PTK wit.;. an obvious disinc.:::ntive to return to 
his country. Even if the ?TK were to return, his accumulated tax bill might 
outstrip his financia1 resources. This option also has the disadvantage of 
putting the PTK in the position of being able to negotiate for a. lower tax 
lia.bili ty as a co11di tion of his returning. 
89. The effectiveness of the second option depends on vhat measures for applying 
pressure on the P'rK a.re a,vailable to the developing country. For example, the 
PTK may have to ask the developing country to renew his passport or his medical 
or engineering licence, a.;1d the developing country can refuse to co-operate unless 
the P'rK' s tax liatili ty has been satisfied. 22.1/ 
90. The third option ma.y not be a.vai1able to all developed countries. 11he 
British~ Canadian and American courts, }1/ for example, may not recognize a foreign 
tax judgement, appa.:rently on the tbeor;r tha.t a tax is aE assertion of a foreign 
country's sovereignty which another independent countr:r could not admit within its 
borders. A sirniJ.ar argument is sometimes made that taxes are closely connected 
32! See Elisabeth Owens, ,:United States Income Tax Treaties~ Their Role in 
Relieving Double Ta.xation", Rutgers Law Review, Vol.- 17, 1963, p. 450. 
36/ Compare the Venezuelan use of certificate.s of solvency; see 
F'atri~ Kelley and Oliver Oldman (eds.), Reaciirnrs on Income Tax Administration, 
Foundation _?rass, Ivrineola, Neu York, 1973;, pp. 510-15. 
YI) See~ e.g., United States -of America v. Harden, 41 DLR (2d) 721, 1968. 
rn/:s/c. 6/Ac. 4/7 
page 27 
with public policy and foreign relations; by ruling on the ~,a.J.idity of foreign 
tax1;;s, -the judiciary might embe.rass its own countJ'.'y or the fc~eign country. 2§/ 
91. The fourth option, engaging the assistance of the developed country's tax 
administration, is the most effective one. Since the developed country has 
jurisdiction both over the ?TK and over his assets within.the country, it is 
obviously in a position to brihg to bear the full weight of its own collection 
machinery. A tax administration that is asked to provide collection assistance 
may either (i) refuse all collection assistance; (ii) provide some collection 
assistance informally;· or (iii) agree to undertake collection assistance only 
in accordance with a formal commitment. 
92. Several tax administrations have refused to engage in intergovernmental tax 
collection assistance of any kind. -:t1/ A country that feels it would gain very 
little through such co-operation will not wish to expend its limited 
administrative personnel in collecting taxes on behalf of a foreign country, .4Q/ 
Other tax administrations may, under certain circumstances, informally help 
another country collect its taxes. If a PTK does.not dispute the amount of 
developing country tax assessed, a developed country tax administration might send 
him a letter demanding that he pay the amount owed. This apparent joining of 
forces by the developing and the developed countries could be enough to frighten 
the taxpayer into paying, even if neither the tax administration nor the courts 
were to take any action if the PTK ignored the letter. 
93. The United States does not engage in collection assistance on an informal 
basis. Any collection assistance offered by the United States - or, for that 
matter, by most Western European countries - is in pursuance of a formal 
commitment contained in a tax treaty.&/ Most treaties have explicit provisions 
pledging each country's assistance to the other in the collection of taxes, but 
assistance is usually limited to situations in which taxpayers wrongfully seek 
.2§/ Surr, op.cit. p. 222. For criticism of this doctrine, see 
Lawrence ·Robertson, nExtraterri torial Enforcement of Tax Obligations 11, Arizona 
Law Review, Vol. 7, 1966, p. 219, Although the United States courts will not 
enforce foreign tax judgements, they will, under certain conditions, enforce 
non-tax judgements. The United States cou:rt must be convinced (1) that the 
foreign court had proper jurisdiction to issue the judgement; (2) that ·a fair. 
trial was conducted under c1 system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial 
administra:tion of justice; ( 3) that the judgement was not procured by fraud; 
and ·(4) that the underlying ·cause of action is not contrary to the public policy 
of the United States. See American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, 
Second~ Conflict of Laws, American Law Institute l?ublishers, St. Paul, Minn., 
1971, § 98; see also Monrad Paulsen and Michael Sovern, '"Public Policy" 'in the -
Conflict of Laws', Columbia. Law Review, Vol. 56, 1956, p. 969. 
3:l./ Surr, op.cit., p. 220. 
AQ./ This feeling was also echoed in recent conversations between the authors 
of this study and officials of the United States Internal Revenue Service. 
W ··Historically, the United States has not entered into collection 
agreements, or exchange of information agreements, independently of a tax treaty. 
to obtain treaty benefits. !J1./ The case of a PTK who has failed to pay taxes to 
a developing country does not constitute s'.wh a situation. 0nly one recent ,,
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United States treaty provides for assistan.:e under more gene:;:al circumstances. !LU 
94. The use of collection assistance agTeements is a rela.ti vely undeveloped area.. 
Over and above taxpayer resistance to such provisions, which is undoubtedly an 
obstacle to their adoption, _4Y difficult policy questions must also be resolved. 
For example, under what conditions can one country refuse to assist the other in 
the collection of taxes? If a developing country levies a tax only on non-
residents who a.re PTKs, and if a similar tax would be unconstitutional if enacted 
by the United States, should the United States nonetheless provide collection 
assistance to the developing country? How can the taxpayer be protected against 
arbitrary conduct by the taxing country? The lack of agTeement on these issues 
has hindered intergovernmental co-operation in the collection of taxes. 
95. As this brief survey of existing practices indicates, some precedent does 
exist for international co-operation in the exchange of tax information and, 
to a much less extent, i~ the collection of foreign taxes. The limited amount 
of co-operation now being offered, however, would clearly be inadequate if more 
than just a few PTKs failed to comply with the developing country tax laws. 
96. Assuming a developed country was willing to offer broader assistance than 
usual, it might not do so without the assurance that other developed countries 
were similarly inclined. Otherwise, ruiy developed country that was competing 
with other developed countries for special types of PTKs, such as doctors, might· 
fear that its enforcement efforts would only divert immigration to those countries 
not willing to.offer the same assistance. Wb.ether all the developed countries 
.could come to an agreement on the appropriate amount of assistance without 
detailed international negotiations in a forum such as the United Nations, is 
doubtful. 
7. A syntheais 
97. A developing country ta.x on residents and citizens working abroad would be 
compatible with existing jurisdictional concepts of taxation. The legal 
struct~~e therefore exists for a developing country to levy a tax on· the brain 
drain •. The problem of administration is to evaluate whether or not the 
developing countries can achieve the level of enforcement necessary to implement· 
the tax. The factors to be considered in making this evaluation a.re~ (a) the 
over-all· efficiency of the developing countries r tax administration; (b) the 
developing countries' prior experience with taxing foreign income; ( c) the _ 
existing level of taxpayer morality; (d) the social and economic conditions that 
generated PTK emigration; (e) the developing countries' access to the assets of 
W E.g. "Each of the Contracting States shall endeavour to collect such' 
taxes imposed by the other Contracting State 8,s-will ensure that any exemption 
or reduced rate of tax granted under this Convention by that other. Contracting 
State shall not be enjoyed by persons not entitled to such benefits. 11 
Article 27, United States-Japan Tax Treaty • 
.42/ "The two Contracting States undertake to lend assistance and support to 
ea.ch_other in the collection of the taxes to which the present Convention relates 
••• in ca~es where th~ taxes are definitely due according to the laws of the 
State making the application. 11 Article 27, United States-France Ta:x Treaty. 
_4Y Elisabeth Owens, op. cit., p. 451. 
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emigrant PTKs; (f) possible renunciation of citizenship PTKs in order to avoid 
the tax; and (g) the host de'leloped country's attitude to1;.ra.rd assisting- in the 
collection of foreign taxes. Most developing countries will require substantial 
assistance from the host developed countries in administering the tax; yet little 
precedent exists so far for such Fidespread intergovernmental co-operation, 
although there seems to be scope for doing so through a process of internationally 
conducted iations. 
C. Taxation of PTKs by the developed countries 
98. The alternative to a developing country tax is for the host developed country 
to levy a special tax on PTKs. 'rhe tax could be collected as part of the 
developed country's usual procedures but i:-:ould be separate from the tax revenue 
that would se go to the developed country rs treasuriJ. 
99. In the case of the United States, a, special tax on PTKs might raise serious 
constitutional problems. A2/ Even if the legality of a United States tax on 
PI1Ks were beyond question it is doubtful whether Congress would such a tax. 
Furthermore, it is hard to other developed countries adopting the tax. 
It is a,lso easy to overstate the administrative simplicity of colle·cting a 
developed country levied tax on PTKs. There may be a number of problems involved 
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Ari int~rnational brain drain tc:.x (IBDT): some cnnsideration~ 
100. Many of the _issues rais.ed in the preceding s~ctions could best be resolved 
in the institutional framework provided by an international organization, such as 
the United Hations system. This part, therefore, attempts to identify the role 
an international orga."lization, such as the United Nations could play in 
overcoming these problems and in effectively implementing an international brain 
drain tax ( IBDT). No other f arum provi·des a· mechanism for balancing -the d-i-v.erse 
interests of the developing countries, the developed countries and the PTKs and 
for reccmciling possible conflicts between the revenue raising brain drain 
proposals and internationa,l law. In view of the serious administrative and 
enforcement problems encountered by a developing country acting unilaterally; 
effective implementation of the proposal is likely to occur only under the 
auspices of an international organization. 
101. Participation by the United Nations system could take a number of forms. As 
a start, developing countries could be infoTined about their authority under 
accepted international custom to levy a special tax on their residents and 
nationals abroad. The United Nations could sponsor research distilling and 
analysing the experiences of the United States, Mexico, the Philippines, and 
other countries that tax on the basis of citizenship. The research could serve 
as the basis on which to provide technical expertise necessary in overcoming the 
problems discussed above. Just as important, the United Nations could provide a 
forum through which the host developed countries could. co-operate in helping to 
enforce the developing country tax. It could also play a more active role in 
order to assure the widespread adoption of an international brain drain tax (IBDT) 
by rendering assistance in designing, implementing and adopting the IBDT, rather 
than leaving it to the initiative of the individual countries. Without the 
active support of the international community, through such a body as the 
United Nations, fears of adverse reaction might make individual developed countries 
wary of co-operat_cng unilaterally with tk developing count :es. 
102. What forms might the IBDT take? If it were desirable for the IBDT fo conform 
as closely as possible to existing patterns of taxation, the IBDT could be 
presented as a way of assisting the developing countries in exe:rcising their 
rights to assert tax jurisdiction on the basis of citizenship. Under this version, 
thE: IBDT would be seen as a simple extension of each developing ~ountry's domestic 
tax system to PTKs abroad, thus allaying fears of a new internationally levied 
global tax. The primary role of an international organization, like the 
United Nations, could be that of a catalyst, establishing a dialogue between the 
parties and providing assistance in overcoming technical and legal obstacles. 
Viewed in this manner, there would not formally be "an IBDT" as such, but rather 
the assertion by each developing country of tax jurisdiction on the basis of 
citizenship, accompanied by the increased co-operation of the developed country 
tax administrations in enforcing the developing country tax. 
103. Support for this ve~sion of the IBDT might come not only fr9m those who saw 
it as a reasonable response to the problems of the brain drain, but. also from 
those who viewed it as a worthwhile change in tax policy for other reasons• In 
fact, the proposal could be treated as a technical change in international tax 
practice, thus laying less emphasis on its origins as a, response. to the brain 
drain. For example, the proposal could be presented in the form of a 
multilateral convention on the enforcement and collection of foreign taxes. 
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104, However presented, there may be little enthusiaom for enforcing a developing 
country tax if the PTK 1s migration was in response to religious or political 
bppression, or harsh social conditions. Even vigorous advocates of a PTK's moral 
duty to share his increased benefits with t.i:10se · 1eft behind i1. the developing 
country. might be troubled oy .i'unds being transferred in such cases. Dealing with 
this problem raises sensitive political problems. An exemption for political, and 
similarly situated, refugees would seem attractive, and the administrative 
modalities for operating such exemptions would have to be carefully considered. 
105. A more fruitful approach might be to distribute the IJ3DT revenue using other 
criteria. An obvious one is to distribute the funds on the basis of need. "Need" 
can, of course, be measured in many different ways and different indices are 
likely to lead to a different ranki:r:,g of developing.countries (though some 
developing countries will appear rela.tively rich or relatively poor regardless of 
the indices chosen). 
106. Developing countries receiving funds on the basis of need, however, will not 
necessarily be those countries experiencing a brain drain. If the relationship 
between need and the brain drain becomes too attenuated, the brain drain proposals 
might come to be seen as a foreign aid programme. Should the debate over the 
proposals become a debate over foreign aid, the persuasive value of the unique 
moral and economic underpinnings of the proposals will be diminished. 
107, Because of these considerations, many developing countries, PTKs and 
developed countries might prefer .a scheme that earmarks the revenue generated by 
the IBDT for spending on brain drain (or education) oriented projects, similar to 
the IBRFs proposed with respect to the charitable contribution. Transferring 
revenµe .to the IHRFs created for charitable contributions, or to specially 
creat'ed IBDT IHRFs will distinguish the brain drain proposalG from a more general 
foreign aid programme and should appeal both to persons who want to use the funds 
to compensate the developing countries for their losses and to persons who view 
the brain drain pro~osals as a means of redistributing income and wealth. PTKs 
may also be more li .ely ~o favour a progran:.,1e that was projec \-oriented rather 
than country-oriented. These optiuns are, however, not mutually exclusive. Part 
of the brain drain revenue could be allocated on a country-by-country basis, 
taking into account both "need" as well as PTK emigration. Part of this allocati.on 
could, in turn, be earmarked for specific projects with the remainder left 
unrestricted. The revenue that was not allocated .on a country basis could be 
earmarked for specific projects or specific countries or both. 
108. Once the simple connexion between the PTK and the country receiving the 
revenue has been broken, there would be no logically compelling reason to view the 
tax as simply an extension of the developing countries' tax jurisdiction to 
nationals abroad: The supplementary tax could then be treated as a truly 
international brain drain tax, and the international community would be free to 
decide through negotiations ho\v best to design the IBDT. The appendix pursues 
some of the structural decisions that have to be made. It is useful, however, to 
present at least one version of the IBDT to illustrate how it might be 
implemented. For illustrative purposes, therefore, assume that the IBDT is levied 
as a surtax on the PTK's tax liability in the developed country, an approach that 
presents fewer problems than do the alternatives discussed in the appendix. 
109. At a first glance, a surtax appears simple to ad.minister since it is based 
on the developed country tax. One would suspect that it could be easily 
implemented by simply adding a line to the existing developed country tax 
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return. j§_/ This administrative simplicity is deceptive, however; in many 
respects, administering a surtax applicable only to some developed country 
taxpayers, that is, only to PTKs, rather than to all taxpayers is e9-uivalent to 
the adoption of an entirely separate tax. The ad.ministration must ,i) modify or 
prepare special tax forms; (ii) compile and update the roll of taxpayers subject 
to the tax; (iii) design special withholding tables and instructions; (iv) develop 
current payment programmes for the self-employed and other taxpayers not subject 
to withholding; (v) plan taxpayer information programmes including the 
preparation of descriptive pamphlets and mass· education programmes concerning 
filing requirements; (vi) write regulations and rulings that interpret the 
statute; and (vii) train officials to answer questions from taxpayers and to deal 
with disputes on appeal. Most of these problems are manageable, but must be 
thought through in a new context. 
110. As an example, consider the need of establishing and maintaining the tax 
roll. Some means must be developed so that both the tax administration and 
withholding agents or other payers can easily identify individuals subject to the 
IBDT. One way of building the required tax roll would be to obtain the relevant 
information from the immigration authorities. If the IBDT were levied on all 
developing country migrants, it should not be a major problem for the immigration 
bureaux to produce a list of newly entering individuals subject to the tax. If, 
however, the IBDT were levied, not on all developing country migrants but only on 
certain categories of professionals, it might be far more difficult for the 
immigration authority to verify the status of each immigrant.(See part A of the 
appendix.) 
111. If the tax administration is capable of identifyine the PTKs, it would be 
able to send each of them information on their special tax obligations. A PTK 
could also be required to inform his employer of his status for withholding 
purposes. 
112. As this brief description of just one aspect of the administrative problem 
illustrates, the IBDT would require some changes in present developed country 
practices and co-operation from the developed countries in enforcing the IBDT 
with the requisite degree of vigilance. 
M/ The collection of taxes by one level of the government for the benefit 
of another is called "piggybacking 11 • /Provisions exist in the United States 
allowing the Internal Revenue Service to collect a state's income tax as part of 
its collection of the federal income tax. Due to administrative considerations, 
a condition for using the "piggybacking" provisions is that the state's income 
tax base conforms closely to the federal tax base, although some differences are 
tolerated. These "piggybacking" provisions could be expanded to cover the IBDT 
and perhaps include the types of adjustments to the tax base discussed in 
Part B.l of the appendix. The IRS proposed regulations for state piggybacking 
may be found at 42 Federal Register 5 1790, 29 September, 1977. 
Chapter IV 
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International assessment on host developed countries 
113. A particularly important proposal that has received much attention in recent 
debates on the brain drain concerns the levying of a special assessment on host 
developed countries in recognition of the benefits that these countries derive 
from the immigration of skilled manpower from the developing countries. The 
rationale behind such a proposal has been rigorously advanced and discussed in 
the accompanying study prepared for the UNCTAD secretariat by 
Jagdish N. Bhagwati. @ Suffice it to say here tha.t the assessment would 
recognize and help share the extent to which the developed countries were 
enriched by the immigration of persons whose talents are in short supply in all 
countries and would help to share this out. The proceeds from the assessment 
would provide an additional source of revenue for the internationally sponsored 
Human Resource Funds. 
114. The concept itself is not a new one and would simply involve the use of 
existing procedures which implement the provisions of the Charter of the 
United Nations on assessments through the enactment of a resolution. 
115. The assessment could be designed to take into account a number of variables. 
For example, the assessment could be a function of the total number of FTKs who 
immigrated to the developed country, the amount of their income, the amount of 
tax they paid to the developed country or the amount of their IBDT, the relative 
scarcity of their skills in their developing country of origin, the amount of 
education they received at developing country expense, or any other combination 
of factors that ,.rould generally reflect the costs and problems of specific 
developing countries as well as the enrichment of the developed countries. A§/ 
116. In cases wher" the assessment on host developed countries did not reflect 
adequately the flow of PTKs between specific pairs of countries, bilateral 
agreements could provide for additional transfers of funds. These supplementary 
agreements could provide for additional transfers of funds. They would recognize 
the special conditions existing between countries, or would adjust for unique 
flows of PTKs among contiguous countries. International organizations, such as 
the United Nations, can encourage the use of supplementary agreements by 
providing the necessary technical assistance, statistical information, and moral 
suasion. 
!il./ TD/B/C. 6/AC .4/2, op. cit. 
~ If the assessment were substantial, developed countries might be 
encouraged to reduce levels of PTK immigration. Some constraints are therefore 
imposed on the amount of the assessment. 
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117. The admini.stra tive p:rolJlel'!'.s poeed by an -1,tssessment on host developed 
countries a:re modaet in ccm.pa.:rfoon wi.th thcae encou.ntered in levying a. opecia.J. 
international tax on individuals.. As en illustration, conoide:r an assessment 
baaed only on the income earned by the total group cf skilled migra~ts in a boat 
developed country. To compute the aeaeaament only- aggregate d.~.ta .is need.ed; euch 
information can be obta.in.ed from t,<3,lllple surveys and c:ross-ecctional at-..1diea. Some 
cf these atudiee have already been p:re_pe.red. by econ01nh1ts concerned with mefu.mring 
the 'bra.in d:t•ain.. It ia far eeaier to upda.fo thr~se studJ.f.rn period.i.cally, e·1ot1. if 
va:rlables other than income were involved, than it is to assess and colhict a tu 
rumu.ally .from individ.ual skilled migrat,ta. Because the assasm&-::mt is levied on 
the host developed country and not on the individual migra.""lts, ·Ir.any of the prcblema 
diocusaed in chapters II and III become either ir.relf!'ll'ant or little 
5:L:!;lificance.. On the other hand. 1 it should 'ba underlined that a.n iftsue of such 
major eignificn.nca will ::i:-equire tho search for soluHcns to procem1 alcmg a. :ou1rioor 
of liriea i."l order to achieve the ·ol!l$t :poss:l.ble n:d.x. 
St,..uctvi:>al· j_ssues in the desi of an 




1. This appendix diocm;ses three major structural issues in th~ design of an 
international :::irain drain tax (IBD'r): defining the class of taxpayers subject to 
the tax; choosing the rules and principles to govern the calcul?-tion of the tax 
base; and selecting an appropriate set of tax rates. The selection of these 
topics is by no means exhaustive. At this point in the evolution o.f the brain 
drain proposals, it does not appear necessary to treat exhaustively and rigorously 
the range of issues raised by the IBDT. The appendix sketches the broad outlines 
of the IBDT, in order to :provide a framework in which rational debate may proceed. 
A. Defining the taxpayer 
2. As originally conceived, the proposals to tax the brain drain were intended to 
apply to professionals, such as scientids, doctors, and engineers. Throughout 
this study, 11 PTK" has been used to indicate generall;r this group of professionals 
who are viewed as coni.prising the heart of thP. brain drain probl,:?m for most 
developing countries. A precise definition would be necessary, however, if the 
term were used to define those individuals who were to be sub,ject to the IBDT. 
3. Any attempt to define PTK faces serious obstacles, .A.lie!ls are present in the 
developed co1mtries !or a multitude of reasons: some come on short business trips, 
others stay for a few years to teach, ·and still others may come as students and 
stay after completing their education. Skills and jobs also come in many 
packages and cio not always fit easily in defined. pigeonholes. Lawyers, 
internati..ona,l civil servants, businessmen and oth8rs may have a good deal of 
flexibility in describing their jobs or skills. Since skills e.nd jobs, as well 
as reasons for bein{: in the developed c01_mtry, will vary from :1rear to year, it 
would not be sufficient to d2termine an alien I s status for purposes of the IllD'11 
only at the timE: of imm.:gration; this would have to 1.)e done annually. 
4. The va,riety of situations encou11tered ·poses a challenge in drafting a 
workable definition of PTK. Fine distinctions are likely to he drawn, and 
considerable strain would be placed on any definition by taxpayer manoeuvres to 
circumvent it. Any wea'lmess in the definition would operate to the advantage of 
the taxpayer. 
5, The alternatj_ve to defining PTK wculd be to include in the scheme all of the 
developing countries 1 residents and citizens in the host developed country.§:} 
a/ In order to avoid difficult determinations of resid3ncy, the IBDT might 
be applied only to developing country nationals. In man;y :.>'?.ses, the PTK will be 
both a resident and a national of the same developing Muntry and ::.t will be 
irrelevant whether the residency test is applied. A difference could result, 
however, in the case of som·e developing countries, such as the United Kingdom's 
former colonies in Africa, \vhere the brain drain may w:msist of PTKs holding 
developed country citizenship. If desirahle, immigration authoriti8s in the 
develo:9ed country could identify these cases and the determination of residency 
could then be made by the tax administration. 
In any case, special rules would have to be provided for persons with dual 




Considerable advantages flow from adopting this approach. First, it would help 
the IBDT to conform as closely as.possible ,to existing ,patterns of taxation. .An 
attempt to single -out PTKs for.. special ·treatment would be. unprecedented and 
perhaps conflict with international law~ J3ut. ev~n:.if this c·onflict did not 
exist the singling out of PTKs.would provide a focus for public criticism _and: 
would· make ·.it more difficult to obtain the. suppor,t .o:f the developed. countries and 
the voluntary compliance of the PTKs., Second, levyin.gthe IBDT on all of the 
developing· countriE.rn _i resid~nts and citizens in, the host developed country would 
allow t.he IBDT rate to. be lowered and. still raise th!3 · saine amount of revenue as . 
would a higher rate applied: only. to PTKs. . Keeping- the tax. rate low has three 
major advantages: · ·(1) the emigrant .P.TK is not. likely. to engage in tax avoidance_ 
or ~vasion if the amount ()f. ta:x: at stake is not_ large; . (2) the P.rK1 s decision to: 
emigrate is unlikely to be. affected by a low rate, thus reducing conflict with 
fundamental human rights, and (3) inequities arising from the la.ck of uniform · . 
treatment of P.rKs, whether due to differences in rate structures, tax bases, and 
so forth will be.less serious. 
6. For some developing .countries, n6 difference may exist between levying the· 
IBDT on ali of their nationals. and residents abroad and levying the IBDT on a 
smaller subset of only P.rKs. This.would be true of developing countries whose., 
brain drain consists primarily of doctors, for ,example,' a profession that would 
clea.rly·be included in all definitions of PTK. However, other developing 
countries may experience a migration of businessmen, as well ,as employees of 
international agencies and multinational corporations. These a.re the groups 
that would pose difficult:definitional problems., , Yet these ,groups represent a 
loss of essential operating, leadership and entrepreneurial abilities, not to 
mention potential suppliers of. capital, even if they a.re not commonly perceived 
of as part of the.brain drain. Given.the rationale of the. IBDT and the . 
considerations in. favour of applying the tax to all developing country residents 
and nationals,. the arguments for applying. the tax only .to Pl1Ks is not persuasive. 
7. Some developing countries, howev.er ~ might object to taxing all residents 
and nationals abroad, not because they are worried about reaching businessmen, 
international civil servants, and. so forth, but ,because they do not want to tax 
that group of unskilled or semi-skilled individuals euphemistically referred to 
in Europe asguest::...workers. An attempt to exempt this group.with a functional 
definition would raise· ·many of. the problems discussed above. A more feasible· 
approach would· be to levy the IBDT only on incomes. above a certain level. Given 
normal salary differentials, it should be possible to set the level differently 
nationality would be sufficient to subject him to the IBDT. • · A problem would 
arise, however, if the IBDT revenues were returned to.the countries of origin, 
since it would then be necessary: to· decide how.· to allocate the tax. 
It will be more l~kely th~t a PT~ ~ith' di.ial natiomi,lity will .be a national 
of both a developing and a developed country. .In this case, rules would. have · 
to be provided to determine the extent to which the taxpayer would be subject to 
the IBDT. The resolution ,of this problem would·have no effect on the taxpayer's. 
status wi.th respect to any 0th.er laws. "; ' · 
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in each developed country ~o that~: the 1mskilled --a.nd se~i..:skilled· work~rs- would be 
exempt from the tax, irrespective of whethQr it was thf::il· brawn or brain or a 
combination which produced their iriccirr.e; 12/ 
B. Selecting a tax base 
a. Once the group 'of tµpayers ha$ bean defined; H is neeesGary to def:ih.e a tax 
base; that ia, to select o·r design the . rules and principles that wi,11 .be. used. ip ;' 
calculating the amount of income subject to the IBD'l'. 'Fnough all countries that ~ 
employ an income tax must develop this set of rules and principles' no two . ·_ ... : :. 
countries employ identical· approaches. . · This result is not surprising,. . .. ·: · · : : ' ... 
cons_idering the great va:dety of ite!Tls tha.t enter in~o the calculation of the tax: .. 
base: ca.pi tal gains; di videnda, interest,, royalties, deferred · c6mpensa.tion , . ' 
agreements, stock optionst. e.nnuities, insurance proceeds1 gifts, inhoritanc'es,' 
alimony' stock redemptions,'' depreciation, t'fav,el a.rid entertainment expenses, 
charitable contributions, m~dica.l cxpeiisesi: l9sse·s, .and sq forth. • .. Little . . 
agreement exists, even· in principle, · as' to ·tlie correct treatmerit of many of these 
items, an'd in those cases where agreement l'l18J'_.' exist, :political, 'social and '; . 
economic considerations, or e.dniiri'istra.tive. constraints lead count':ries to' adopt, ' ,. 
greater divergent approaches •.. Accordingly, a large number of al tc:rnat.i,"ve~ ai'E! > 
available for defining the ·IBDT base· and can be broken down into three major ;_ .·,.·: • 
choices: using the host d~veloped country"s tax base, using the developing · ·. · 
country's tax base, or designing a special !BDT base. · 
'.'El Whether 'the 'i::Bn.'r:)~s applied ~ml:c to PTKs' or to al: de'velopine· countcy' 
residents and nationals, some exemption si~ould be provided for individuals . 
temporarily present ··in the de1ieloped count:cy. · Applying the IBDT to individuals 
on a business trip to the devel'oped country, or to employee a on short-term' ' 
assignments is an administrative nuisance not warranted by either the small 
amount of revenue at stake or the objeotivea- or the tax.-.. .: .. : ... ~/. 
An exemption for short..:.te~mvisitors to the developed country can be provid,ed 
by various m.echanisms. . . One approach is . to apply• the. IBDT only to. Jndividuala who. 
have entered the developed country unde1· an immigration visa.. .This approach is·· 
administratively a.ttractive,sinoe·a list of ·immigrants should. be readily available 
from the pro:per..,anthorities. · ::It is possible, howew~r, to spend prolonged periods 
of time in many developed countries, legally as well as illegally, without. . 
obtaining an immigration visa. Certainly the loss to a developing country is the 
same when a doctor is ,abroad f'or·five:yeari:l, regardless of .the doctor's status , 
under developed country.immigrat.ion law. Taxing only those holding immigration 
visas is .therefore likely,. to ;-bo .too narrow an approach. 
It would-be more con'sisterrt ~ith the objectives of the IBDT to dh.fine the. 
exerilption in. terms· of ~he .lengt~ ,of stay ~il the dt>.rvoloped ·country.'_·' For example, 
the IBDT might' apply if the i:ndividti.al has been present in '·the developed country. 
for some miniminn period:' of timt.,/ perhaps 180 ,fays. · :By examiriing "the prior flow 
of individuals' between the· developit'6' country and each developed' country, it 
might be' possible" to. aeiect a,' time :t,eriocl that, eliminated 'mo·at of'.:tha nuisance. 
cases from taxat·~on·; ;':. 4n<?th!'?r 'approacri fs tb Use 'the developed : country IS i rules Of 
residency. The ,develo:p~d .. ' cm_mtry will normally· have . to decide· at · what point the 
migrant} S presenc~ become°o 'pe:rfriariel'l:t Ot.lOUf',h tr, .warrant being ·subj_octed, to the ·., ''. 
normal' 'develop'ed couhtcyrta.x1 regime and the ;IBDT can utilize the Sall'iO criteria. 
The IBDT would thus apply ·whenever the migrant becai.r.e @. tax resident under"·:· 




1. On using the developed country's tax base 
9, Administrative considerations weigh heavily toward using the developed country 
tax base. Presumably, most PI1Ks wi11 be paying devfc:loped country taxes and will 
have to determine their developed country base for this purpose. Using the 
developed country tax base for pu~poscis of tre IBDT thus imposes no additional 
administrative burden on the PTK. More important, the d2veloped co1.u1try tax 
administration's normal audit and investication machinery will be enlisted 
automatically on behalf of the IBDT, and contr-:wersies arising over the tax base 
will be resolved through the dcv8 loped c,'.)1.mtr;y' s usual appeal procedures, 
eliminating the need for any special IBDT r.1achir'.ery. 
10. But not all PTKs may have to compute their developed country tax base. For 
example, employees of international organizations - a large group - are exempt 
from developed country taxation. 'I1o bo sure, these persons could be required to 
compute their developed country tax base for purposes of the IBDT, exactly as if 
they were taxable under developed country law, but some special arrangement would 
have to be made for verifying their returns since the developed country tax 
administration would not be concerned with this tax-exempt group. Alternatively, 
in the case of the United Nations and other employees under the International 
Civil Service, the staff assessment may be a satisfactory substitute for the 
developed country base, even though it would not reach unearned or passive forms 
of income such as royalties, interest and dividends. 
11. Other problerr.s are presented by tax shelters and similar tax avoidance 
devices that can be used in certain developed countries to reduce substantially a 
taxpayer's income. Should the developed country tax base be adjusted to eliminate 
the effects of these ta}: avoidance devices? Are there circumstances where the 
PTK should pay a minimum IBDT, regardless of his developed country taxable income? 
Answers to these questions will vary, depending on the type of provisions found 
in each developed country's tax law. If the developed country tax administration 
is computerized, c rtain adjustments in th tax base should 1:-.: feasible. 
2. On using the developing country's tax base 
12. Before adopting a form of the IBD'.r that is basically an extension of the 
developing country income tax, the developing country tax base must be examined 
closely to determine whether it can satisfactorily be applied to PTKs. Since 
many developing cou..ritries will have had little experience taxing individuals 
abroad, the assertion of citizenship jurisdiction wi11 expose for the first time 
possible weaknesses in the tax base. 
13. A major question is whether the deve1oping country tax base can cope 
adequately with the relativelJ sophisticated business practices and conditions in 
the developed country. Developing country tax law may offer little guidance as 
to the tax consequences of transactions and practices that are common in the 
developed country but unfamiliar (or perhaps illegal) in the developing country. 
Certainly any grey areas or vacuums in the developing country law will be 
resolved by the PTK in his favour and therefore many transactions may fail to 
enter into the developing country tax base. The developing country will have to 
evolve policies for dealing with these transactions, an effort that may or may not 
be justified depending on the amount of revenue at stake. .Alternatively, it may 
be possible to defer to the developed country's treatment of any item not 
sufficiently dealt with by the developing country tax base, but this raises the 
knotty problem of integrating developed country tax law with developing country 
tax law. 
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14, Additional difficulties in acco!llillodating the developing countr;:v tax base to 
developed country business practices may E;ri se. For example, some developing 
countries place a cLiling on advertising, travel, or entertainment expenses. The 
ceiling is obviouily determined in the context of condi~ions prevailing in the 
developing country ana may be totally unrealistic in the case of a taxpayer 
working abroad. Even when the ceilings are expressed as a percentage of income, 
such as a rule limiting deductions for advertising expenses to 10 per cent of sales 
revenue, the percentage may be grossly out of line ~rith developed country business 
practices. 
15. Other provisions in the developing country tax code may also be expressed in 
absolute amounts. To take just one exa~ple, it is cor:JIJ1on for countries to 
adjust an individual's tax burden to reflect the size of his family. A common 
wa·:I of making this adjustment is to allow a deduction in a fixed a111ount for each 
member of the fa.11ily. The amount chosen, however, nay not reflect any rational 
policy if the taxpayer is abroad. 
16. The-developing country tax base would have to be examined to see whether 
certain benefits should not be extended to PTKs abroad. For example, many 
developing countries utilize a system of generous capital allowances or investment 
credits to encourage domest_ic capital investment. At the time these benefits 
were.first introduced, investment in capital assets abroad may have been uncom.'Ilon 
and thus no thought was given to limiting the 1:Jenefits to only domestic investment. 
A country might not wish to exte.nd these benefits to foreign investment, however. 
17. On the other hand, a devel_oping country may decide to extend a special 
deduction to taxpayers abroad to mitigate burdens not imposed on taxpayers within 
the country, such as larger-than-normal moving expenses, or the costs of sending 
children to special schools. 
18. In order to pla.ce the preceding problems in perspective, it is useful to 
distinguish salaried employees from pelf-emp::..oyed individuals. Advertising 
deductions, travel and entertainment expenses, depreciation and investment 
allowances have relativGly little impact on salaried employees, who may t.:onstitute 
the heart of the brain drain for many developing countries. To be sure, even. 
these employees I'.lay pose difficulties if part of their remuneration consists of 
deferred compensation agreements, profit sharing and pension plans, stock options,. 
or other sophisticated fringe benefits with which the developing countries may have 
little experience, 
3. Adoption of a special tax base 
19, The problems ·that accompany the use of either the developed country or the 
developing country tax bases can be overcome by adopting a special, independent 
base for purposes of the IBDT. sJ Indeed, even if no problems existed with 
respect to. using the developi_ng country or the developed country base, a special 
IBDT base is necessary in order to naintain equality of treatment among PTKs 
having the same before-tax gross income. Unless the same set of rules were used 
in calculating their tax bases, PTKs having the same before-tax gross income.may 
not have the same taxable income. For example, if the developed country tax base 
s./ In one sense, adjustments to the developed cou...11.try tax base of the 
nature discussed in Section B.l of this appendix would be a first step toward the 
design of a special IBDT base. But such adjustments would ta.1-(e as their starting 
point the developed country tax base, and may therefore oe inadequate in achieving. 




is used, the calculation of taxable income will vary depending on the PTK' s host 
country; if the developing tax base is used, taxable income will va:ry depending 
on the P'.11K' s country of origin. The latter result may not be- objectionable 
where the IBDT is essentially an extension of the developing country income tax, 
but where the IBDT revenue is earmarked for brain drain funds or other general 
developmental spending, little justification exists for applying different rules 
in calculating the P'.11Ks tax base. 
20. Whatever merits a separate IBDT base has, ease of administration is not one of 
them. All the administrative problems identified in the tax with respect to the 
use of a surtax would be greatly compounded, since no countriJ or group of persons 
would have had any experience working with the new tax base. Extensive mass 
education programmes would thus be necessary to educate taxpayers and their 
accountants and lawyers . Integrating the IBDT with the developed country 
withholding procedures might be formidable if the two tax bases differ greatly. 
A new IBDT staff would be required to answer taxpayer questions, perform the 
necessary audit, intelligence, and collection functions; some form of appeal 
proceduxe would also have to be established. 
21. The administrative problems caused by the use of a special IBDT base are 
substantial, but not insurmountable. The problems are similar to those faced by 
a country when it introduces an income tax for the f irst time. Realistically, 
support for the IBDT will be a function of how easily the tax can be implemented 
without causing major disruption or changes in existing practices . The spectre 
of a new international bureaucracy, which may be required if a special base is 
used for the IBDT, would dampen the political attractiveness of the tax. 
C. Selecting a rate schedule 
22. The final step in calculating the IBDT involves applying a tax rate to the 
migrant's tax base. The rate structure of the IBDT can be based on the developed 
country's rate struc-!;ure, the developing cowtry 1s rate structu:."e or can be 
specially designed. 
1. Using the developed country rate schedule 
23. In its simplest form, the IBDT rates could be set at some percentage of the 
developed country's tax rates. For example , every tax rate in the developed 
country schedule could be increased by 10 per cent and the increased rates applied 
to the IBDT base. 
24. If the developed country's tax b2.se were used as the IBDT base, (and the case 
for using the developed country's rates is strongest when the developed country's 
base is also used), this procedure is equivalent to a 10 per cent surtax; that 
is , a 10 per cent tax levied on the developed country tax. The PTK would 
calculate his tax liability, 1L.~der the developed country's normal rules, using the 
developed country's regular tax schedule; the 10 per cent IBDT would then be 
applied to the developed country tax liability. 
25. A major advantage of the surtax approech is that it automatically relates the 
additional tax burden imposed by the IBDT to the developed coU-.~try 1 s tax. Since 
the developed country's tax reflects what is regarded as e, fair tax burden given 
conditions in the developed country, the surtax is a convenient means of assuring 
that the additional burden resulting fr-0m the IBDT will not be unreasonable. 
26 . The political attractiveness of the IBD'r mc"y be enhanced by the use of a 




about the effect of the IBDT on an individual I s decision to migrate can easily 
calculate the additional tax burden at any given income l2vel. A surtax set at 
10 per cent, for ex,,mple, should eliminate fears that the IBD'l' will curtail 
migration or result in wholesale renunciations of citizenships or othe:r means of 
avoiding the tax. Moreover, because the rate would be set by an international 
agency, a developing country would be powerless to use the rate as a means of 
either restricting emigration or punishing those who hav2 already migrated. 
27. If the surtax were a flat percentage of the develop·2d crnmtry tax, such as 
10 per cent, the IBDT would mirror whatever progressivity was inherent in the 
developed country rate structure. If different degrees of progressivity were 
desired, the rate of the surtax could be made a function of the developed country 
tax liability. For example, if the IBDT wanted more progressive rates than that 
evidenced by the country's rates, the rate of the surtax could increase as the 
amount of the developed country tax increased. 
28. Administrative considerations also argue in favour of tho surtax approach. 
Although not simple to administer, a surtax causes fewer problems for the developed 
country's tax administration than cfo other approaches. 
29. Another advantage is that. the surtax can be eadly integrated with the 
assessment on the host developed country, as discussed in Chapter IV above. For 
examp1e, the assessment on the developed country could be set at a percentage 
which could be greater than 100 per cent of the surtax. Since the developed 
country would have information available as to each PrK' s surtax, it should be 
relatively easy to calculate j_ts a~rnessment. If the ·surtax ':Tere the exclusive 
measure of the assessment, it would elirainate the need for gathering other data. 
2. Using the develoning country's rate schodule 
30. As was illustrated in the text, the developing count:;:"'J' s rate schedule might 
produce unsatisfachry results if applied t8 a PTK abroad. Tleveloping countries 
commonly usE· very progressive rate structures, and a salary that appears 
extravagant by developing country standards, though only adequate by devGloped 
country standara_s 1 is likely to be heavily taxed. '\.if.hen compared with living 
conditions in the developed country, the developing country tax may be high 
en9ugh to border on the confiscatory. Granting a credit for the developed 
country tax does not eliminate this problem, sincE· the overall burden on the PTK is 
still determined by the developing country tax rate. 
31. As an illustration, consider a PTK in the United States with $20,000 taxable 
income, and a United States tax liability of $5,000. Assume that the PTK's 
country of origin uses a steeply progressive rate schedule. If $20,000 is 
considerGd by developing country standards to be a substantial salary, the PTK is 
likely to be taxed at a very high developing country rate, If the develpping 
country tax is say, $15,000, and if a credit is granted for the devc,loped ·country 
tax, the overall burden on the PTK is $15,000 ($5,000 paid to the United States 
and U0,000 paid to the developing country). When measured against other 
taxpayers in thG Unit0d States the PTK 1Jears a $10,000 additional tax burden. 
Expressed in percentages, the overall tax burden on the PTK represents 
75 per cent of his salary, compared with a 25 per cent burden on United States 
taxpayers at the same incomo level. 
32. Even developing country rate schedules that were not progressive might be 
-qnsatisfactory when extended to individuals abroad, Suppose in the example 
above, the developing country taxed all income a-!:- a fla,t, proportional rate of 
10 per cent, so that the PrK' s develop~ng country tax was $2,000. If the 
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developing country granted a credit for the United States tax, no developing 
country tax would be payable. If no credit were given, the total burden on the 
PrK would equal the sum of the developed co~try and developing country tax, or 
$7,000. The overall tax burden on the PTK would still be 40 per cent greater 
than the tax burden on a United States taxpayer with a similar income, and this 
must be considered harsh. Only if the developing country tax were a small 
percentage of the developed country tax, would the total burden on the PrK be 
reasonable. 
33. An attempt to overcome these problems could be made by developing a special 
schedule for use with every host developed country. The schedule would be 
designed to generate either (a) a tax that was aluays slightly higher than the 
developed country tax, assuming the developed country tax were creditablei or 
(b) if the developed country tax were not creditable, a tax that was a modest 
percentage, perhaps 10 per cent, of the developed country tax. A problem arises, 
however, if great disparities exist between the developed country and developing 
country tax base; the greater the disparities the more difficult it becomes to 
design the desired rate schedule. To illustrate, consider a PTK with $20,000 
income, as determined under developed country rules, and a resulting $5,000 
developed country tax liability. Assuming no credit were to be given for the 
developed 9ountry tax, a satisfactory developing country rato schedule would 
generate a tax of, perhaps, $500. But the PTK's income, as calculated under 
developing country rules, mi.eht be. more or less than $20,000, and this makes 
designing the desired rate schedule difficult. A further complication is 
introduced, since a second P-rK, also having $20,000 under developed country rules, 
would not necessarily have the same income as the first PTK, when calculated 
under developing country rules. Only _i.f both had identical sources of income, 
identical expenses, and so forth would their developing country tax base be the 
same. 
34. Designing a satisfactory developing country schedule will be easiest when the 
developing and devc:ioped country bases are ,;imila:r; but the reater the similarity 
the more closely this approach becomes to the surtax. 
3. A specially designed IBDT rate schedule 
35. Regardless of whether the developed or the developing country rates are used, 
the IBD'r paid by PrKs at the same. income level (putting aside, for the moment, 
the question of which rules will govern the calculation of the- PTK 1 s income) will 
vary. If the ~eve loped country rates are used, the IBDT will be the same for all. 
PTKs at the same income level within the developed country, but will be different 
for PTKs at the same incom~ level in other developed countries. If the developing 
c01mtry tax rat~s are used, the IBD'l' will be the same for all PrKs of that 
developing country, at the same income level, regardless of which developed country 
they were in, but would be different for PTKs at the same income level who come 
from other developing countries. These differences might be acceptable if the 
IBDT were an extension of the developing 9ountry income tax, but if the tax 
proceeds were earmarked for IHR.Fs or other developmental purposes, the amount 
paid by PTKs at the same income level should not be a function of their 
developing country of origin or of their host developed country. Eliminating 
these differences in order to attain more uniform treatment of PTKs can be 
accomplished through the use of a special IBTIT rate schedule. 
36. To illustrate the options avaj__lable in designing this special rate schedule, 
consider t,..,o PTKs working in the United States and the United Kingdom respectively. 
Assume both PrKs have th\3 same income, lJut that the United Kingdom tax is. 




(a) Option 1: The IBDT is set well below either the United Kingdom or the 
United States tax 
37. The rat.e schedv:.'? could be desig:ied so :1a.t for any given ..i.ncome level, the 
IBDT will be substantially below either the United States or the United Kingdom 
tax. For the PTKs under consideration, the IBDT ·tax rate might be designed to 
pro.duce a US$50 tax. Both PTKs would pay this in addition to their normal 
United States and· United Kingdo1n. taxes. Because the IBDT burden is modest, no 
adjus~ment in their developed country taxes is necessary. Both PTKs pay the same 
absolute amount of IBDT, al though e·xpressed as a percentage of their respective 
developed country ta.."'{es, the additional burden on the United Kingdom PTK is higher. 
Since for him, the IBDT is equivalent to a 2,5 per cent surtax, compared with a 
6.67 per cent surtax for the United States. 
(b) 0-ption 2: Ths IBDT io set at a level between the United States and the 
United Kingdom tax 
38, Suppose an IB])T rate were desigrwd to generate a US$1,250 ta.."'{, Unlike 
option J., where the tax was substantially below either the United States or the 
United Kingdom tax:, and therefore imposed on1y a modest additional tax burden on 
the PTKs (6.67 per cent in the c2.se of the United States Pl'K and 2.5 per cent in 
the case of the United Kingdom PTK), here the additional burder.. is significant and 
cannot be ignored. Some adjustment would be required in order to accommodate the 
IBDT. The United States end the United Kingdom could, for example, grant a credit 
for the IBDT. In the case of the United. Ste.tes PTK, the credit for US$1, 250 would 
exceed the United States tax lie.bilitiJ of US$7~0 and no further United ·States tax- would 
be due. The United Kingdom PTK would pay the United Kingdom US$750, the difference 
'between the United Kingdom tax and the IB])T (US$2,000 - US$1,250). 
39. Option 2 satisfies the objective of equalizing the IBDT paid by PTKs at the 
same income level and has the further advantage of generating more revenue than 
Option 1. The higher levGl of revenue is 11accE, possible by the credit provided by 
the developed cmmtri '3. By agreeing to ere·· it the IBDT again: '·, domestic tax, 
the United Kingdom ano the United St2,tes forn.e;o the amoux1ts of tax they would 
otherwise have collected - US$1,250 and US$750 respectively. This amount can 
properly be viewed as a form of developed country assessment and could be 
.creditable against any other host developed country assessment that might be levied. 
The revenue potential of Option 2 is not unlimited; as a practical matter, the 
IBDT rate cannot be set very much higher than the United States rate, regardless 
of the credit, without the total burden on the PTK becoming excessive. 
40. Despite the attractiveness of the increased revenue under Option 2, some 
unfairness may be perceived because the IBDT v:ill impose an additional burden on 
only the United States P1K. The United Kingdom PTK pays the same overall tax 
burden, US$2,000, both before and after implementation of the IB])T, The 
United States PTK, on the other hand, experiences a US$500 increase in his overall 
burden after tlw IBDT is introduced, 
L,l. The preceding examples considered two PTKs at the same income level without 
specifying which rules were to govern the calculation of their tax base. It 
would be consistent with the goal of maintaining international norms to levy the 
IBDT on its own, specially developea. tax base, as was discussed in Part B of this 
appendix. However realistic it may be for the IBDT to develop its own tax base 
over the long-term, in the short-term it will be :necessary to use either the 




Part B, the developed country tax base is the more suitable candidate. Indeed, 
when the objective is to compare PTKs at the same incone level, the developed 
country base is especially attractive because more similarity is likely to exist 
among developed country tax bases than is true of developing country bases. In 
other words, if the incomes of identically situated PTKs were calculated uncler the 
rules of various developed countries, more uniforr.ii ty in the results is _to be 
expected the.n if the incomes were calculated under various developing cour1try rules. 
Therefore, it iG more meaningful for the IBDT to corapare J?TKs at the same income 
level when their incomes are calculated u,~der the various developed country rules, 
rather than under the various developing country rules. 
